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I.
Introduction
Class arbitration—sometimes known as “class action
arbitration”—is a somewhat controversial dispute resolution
device that takes certain procedures more commonly seen in
judicial class actions and transplants them into arbitration. The
mechanism is receiving a great deal of attention in North America
right now, with two closely observed cases having gone all the
way to the U.S. Supreme Court in the last two years.1 However,
interest in this procedure is not limited to the United States.
Canadian courts have also been active in this field, with the
Supreme Court of Canada resolving issues relating to the assertion
of class claims in the face of an arbitration agreement twice in the
last four years.2
Despite sharing a similarly liberal attitude toward the
availability of both arbitration and judicial class actions, the two
countries have taken different approaches to the question of class
arbitration.3 However, neither nation has identified a completely
satisfactory solution to the problems associated with mass claims
in arbitration, suggesting that both jurisdictions could benefit from
a comparative analysis.
Furthermore, Canada and the United States are not the only
countries currently considering the merits of class arbitration.
Interest in class and collective relief in arbitration is increasing all
over the world, with new procedural mechanisms developing all
the time.4 Many observers from outside North America would
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). Although some commentators
claim that class arbitration is “dead” as a result of these cases, that conclusion is
premature. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
2 See Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns, Inc., 2011 SCC 15, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.);
Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801,
para. 87 (Can.); Jeffrey S. Leon et al., Class Arbitration in Canada: The Legal and
Business Case, 6 CANADIAN CLASS ACTION REV. 381, 386 (2010).
3 See Claude Marseille et al., Arbitration and Class Actions in Canada: Where Do
We Stand?, 28 CLASS ACTION REP. 5, 5 (Apr. 2007).
4 For example, Colombia has contemplated the adoption of class arbitration. See
1
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benefit from a deeper understanding of the differences in the way
in which the United States and Canada address the tensions
between collective redress and arbitration.
This Article undertakes just such a comparative analysis and
proceeds as follows. First, Section II lays the groundwork for
comparing class arbitration in Canada and the United States by
describing relevant aspects of each nation’s legal system. Section
III then introduces the concept of class arbitration, including its
basic procedures, its history and its importance in both domestic
and international dispute resolution.
Once the foundation has been laid, the comparative analysis
begins. Section IV contrasts the current state of class arbitration in
the United States and Canada, focusing on three issues that have
arisen as a result of recent Supreme Court precedent in both
countries and that are particularly amenable to comparative
analysis: circumstances in which class arbitration is available;
procedures that must or may be used; and the nature of the right to
proceed as a class. Section V concludes the Article by bringing
the various threads of analysis together and identifying the lessons
that can be learned from comparing the two countries.

Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, Arbitral Tribunal from the Bogota Chamber of Commerce, A
contribution by the ITA Board of Reporters, KLUWERARBITRATION (Apr. 24, 2003),
http://kluwerarbitration.com. Germany recently created a form of collective arbitration
for shareholder disputes. See DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes,
effective Sept. 15, 2009 [hereinafter DIS Supplementary Rules], available at www.disarb.de/ (follow link to proceed in English and select “DIS-Rules” on the left); see also
Christian Borris, Arbitrability of Corporate Law Disputes in Germany, in ONDERNEMING
EN ADR 55, 55-71 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al., eds., 2011); S.I. Strong, Collective Arbitration
Under the DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes: A European Form of
Class Arbitration?, 29 ASA BULL. 45 (2011) [hereinafter Strong, DIS]. Mass procedures
have also been adopted in the context of international investment arbitration. See
Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (2011) [hereinafter Abaclat Award], available at
www.iareporter.com/downloads/20110810 (involving 60,000 Italian bondholders). This
approach has not gone uncriticized. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara and Others) v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Abaclat Dissent],
available at http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.pdf.
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The United States and Canada—Similar but Not
Identical

A. Basic Legal Structures
Before undertaking any comparative analysis, it is important to
outline the differences and similarities between the legal systems
at issue. In many ways, Canada and the United States have a great
deal in common, thus facilitating cross-border comparisons.5 Both
are primarily English-speaking countries,6 strongly influenced by
the English common law tradition, with one civil law territory
(Quebec in Canada, Louisiana in the United States) standing as the
sole representative of continental Europe’s influence on the
nation.7 Both are also federal states that give considerable
authority to the national government while nevertheless retaining
significant power for state, provincial and territorial governments.8
Despite these similarities, several distinctions can be made.
First, important differences arise with respect to the relative ability
of parties within each nation to assert national (or, better stated,
multi-jurisdictional domestic) class actions as a result of
distinctions in the way each nation implements principles of
federalism and jurisdiction. For example, U.S. federal courts have
There are many existing comparative studies in the realm of class actions and
arbitrations in Canada and the U.S. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class
Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2007-2008); Marseille et al., supra note 3, at 5; Shelley McGill,
Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legislative Response, 47 AM.
BUS. L. J. 361 (2010); Ellen Meriwether & Andrew J. Morganti, Emerging Trends in
Certification of Antitrust Class Actions in Canada, 24 ANTITRUST 71 (2010); Geneviève
Saumier, USA-Canada Class Actions: Trading in Procedural Fairness, 5 GLOBAL JURIST
ADVANCES 1 (2005); Susan M. Sharko, et. al., Global Strategies and Techniques for
Defending Class Action Trials: Defending the Global Company in Multinational
Litigation, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 295 (2010). Calls have also been made for Canada to
adopt class arbitration. See J. Brian Casey, Commentary: Class Action Arbitration
Should be Available, LAW. WKLY. (Can.), Mar. 31, 2006.
6 Canada is officially bilingual (English-French), although English is the primary
language outside Quebec.
7 See Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Class Actions in Canada: Country Report
Prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, in 622 THE ANNALS OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 41 (Deborah Hensler et al. Eds., 2009) [hereinafter
THE ANNALS]; see also Nicholas M. Pace, Group and Aggregate Litigation in the United
States, in THE ANNALS, supra, at 32.
8 See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 41; Pace, supra note 7, at 32.
5
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an expansive ability to intervene in a variety of matters, including
those involving class actions. The wide-ranging competence of
the federal judiciary is a direct result of the broad interpretation of
the concept of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution,9 which has arisen despite the jurisdictional
limitations explicitly reflected in Article III of that document.10 As
a result, multi-jurisdictional class actions can be brought in U.S.
federal court with relative ease.
The situation is very different in Canada because, there, the
Federal Court:
is a statutory court, and its statutory jurisdiction does not include
most of the topics that typically give rise to class actions. As the
Court’s statute now stands, its jurisdiction over claims against
the Crown in right of Canada would be the most promising
avenue for class actions. But the Court does not have
jurisdiction over claims in tort or contract against defendants
other than the federal Crown.11

These limitations on the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of
Canada would be of scant significance if provincial courts in
Canada were able to hear multi-jurisdictional classes. However,
provincial courts experience difficulties when attempting to assert
jurisdiction over non-residents.12
As territorially-restricted
institutions, the only time that provincial courts may assert
jurisdiction over a party is: (1) if the party is present in the
jurisdiction, based on service of a writ on the defendant in the
province; (2) if the party consents to jurisdiction; or (3) if the court
can assume jurisdiction, as in cases where there is service of the
writ outside the province supported by a “real and substantial
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8.
Id., art. III; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
11 Peter W. Hogg & S. Gordon McKee, Are National Class Actions
Constitutional?, 26 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 279, 283 (2010). Proposals to expand the power
of the Federal Court with respect to multijurisdictional class actions have been opposed
on constitutional grounds. See CAN. BAR ASS’N, CONSULTATION PAPER: CANADIAN
JUDICIAL PROTOCOL FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CLASS ACTIONS 67 (June 2011) [hereinafter CAN. BAR ASS’N].
12 See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 13-22 (5th ed., 2011
supp.).
9

10
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connection between the litigation and the province.”13 Although
there is no conceptual reason why this test could not be met in
cases involving multi-jurisdictional class actions, the difficulties
associated with asserting jurisdiction over non-residents (which
could include both defendants and unnamed members of the
plaintiff class) have severely limited the development of multijurisdictional classes in Canada.14
The problems experienced by Canada with respect to
jurisdiction over multi-jurisdictional classes involving persons
from different Canadian provinces and territories also extends to
international classes involving persons from Canada and
13 Id. As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court of Canada handed
down decisions in four appeals involving the “real and substantial connection” test. The
main decision, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, CarswellOnt 4268 (Can.),
addresses two of the four appeals, while the two other decisions, Banro Corp. v. Éditions
Écosociété Inc., 2012 SCC 18, 2012 CarswellOnt 4270 (Can.), and Breeden v. Black,
2012 SCC 19, 2012 CarswellOnt 4272 (Can.), each concern a separate matter. While it
is impossible discuss these decisions in this Article at this late date, the Supreme Court
of Canada appears to be announcing a new approach to jurisdiction based on service ex
juris. Of particular interest is the discussion concerning the interaction between
constitutional and private international law as well as the analysis regarding application
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. All of these matters are central to multijurisdictional class actions in Canada, and parties should therefore remain alert to the law
as it develops.
14 See Hogg & McKee, supra note 11, at 292; Tanya Monestier, Is Canada the New
“Shangri-La” of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. __
(forthcoming 2012) (noting issues relating to conflict of laws, jurisdiction, enforcement
of judgments, parallel proceedings and notice). But see Janet Walker, Are National
Classes Constitutional? A Reply to Hogg and McKee, 48 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 95, 143
(2010) [hereinafter Walker, National]. The debate in Canada has focused on both the
constitutionality of multijurisdictional class actions as well as practical procedural issues.
See generally CRAIG JONES, THEORY OF CLASS ACTIONS (2003); Chris Dafoe, A Path
Through the Class Action Chaos: Selecting the Most Appropriate Jurisdiction with a
National Class Action Panel, 3 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 541 (2006); Stephen Lamont,
The Problem of the National Class: Extra-territorial Class Definitions and the
Jurisdiction of the Court, 24 ADVOCATES’ Q. 252 (2001); F. Paul Morrison et al., The
Rise and Possible Demise of the National Class in Canada, 1 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV.
67 (2004); Janet Walker, Recognizing Multijurisdictional Class Action Judgments Within
Canada: Key Questions—Suggested Answers, 46 CANADIAN B. L.J. 450, 465 (2008)
[hereinafter Walker, Recognizing]. Nevertheless, Canadian courts, commentators and
counsel have been working on mechanisms to facilitate multijurisdictional and national
class actions in both the domestic and international contexts. See CAN. BAR ASS’N,
supra note 11, at 1-25. Although several protocols have recently been adopted by the
Canadian Bar Association (CBA), these are merely advisory and thus do not provide
parties with any degree of certainty.
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elsewhere.15 Indeed, Canada is not alone in this, for the United
States has also experienced difficulties in this regard, although it,
like Canada, has had some limited ability to assert jurisdiction
over international classes.16 Interest in cross-border collective
relief has also been seen outside North America.17

See Can. Post Corp. v. Lépine, 2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 549 (Can.); see
also Currie v. McDonald’s Rest. Can. Ltd. (2005) 74 O.R. 3d 321 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
However, the recent case of Silver v. Imax Corp. has been heralded as potentially making
“Ontario a new haven for secondary market class actions” involving shareholders from
around the world. Mark Gelowitz, Court Certifies Class Action Against Imax: Liability
May be Coming Soon to a Theatre Near You, LAW. WKLY., Feb. 19, 2010, available at
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/ (select “archives,” then select “2010,” and then
“February”); Silver v. Imax Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5573 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); see also
Silver v. Imax Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5585 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Monestier, supra note
14.
16 See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571(RJH)(HBP),
2009 WL 855799, at *14 (S.D.N.Y., Mar 31, 2009); see also HSBC Bank Can. v.
Hocking, [2006] R.J.Q. 804, 2006 QCCS 330, paras. 83-88; Parsons v. McDonald’s
Rest. Can. Ltd., (2004), 45 C.P.C. 5th 304 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). However, such mixed
international classes are dismissed at least as often, if not more so. See Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885-89 (2010); Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d
120, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2004); Johnson v. United States, 238 F.R.D. 199, 214-15 (W.D.
Tex. 2006). The American Bar Association (ABA) has recently adopted two protocols
on judicial communications and notice provisions in cross-border class actions. See
ABA, PROTOCOL ON COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CANADA-U.S. CROSSBORDER CLASS ACTIONS AND NOTICE PROTOCOL: COORDINATING NOTICE(S) TO THE
CLASS(ES) IN MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CLASS PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.cba.org/cba/resolutions/pdf/11-03-A-bckd.pdf; see also Betsy M. Adeboyejo,
Protocols for Cross-Border Cases . . . Will They Work?, ABA NOW (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://www.abanow.org/ (select “Around the Bar”). The American Law Institute (ALI)
has also drafted guidelines in this area of law. See AM. L. INST., GUIDELINES APPLICABLE
TO COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER CASES (2000), available at
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/supreme_court/practice_and_procedure/practice_directions
_and_notices/General/Guidelines%20Cross-Border%20Cases.pdf; see also AM. L. INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010).
17 One of the leading jurisdictions for resolution of mass disputes is the
Netherlands. See Monestier, supra note 14 (citing 2005 Dutch Act on the Collective
Settlement of Mass Claims but noting that is a settlement-only device); see also Ianika
Tzankova & Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer, The Netherlands, in THE ANNALS, supra note 7,
at 149. Cross-border collective redress is also becoming a major issue in the European
Union, with the European Commission recently undertaking a public consultation on the
issue. See European Commission, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European
Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 (Feb. 4, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/ou54/sec_2011_173_en.pdf.
The
International Bar Association (IBA) has not only weighed in on the European
consultation process but has also drafted its own set of guidelines regarding cross-border
15
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B. Class Actions
Another area of interest involves the laws specifically relating
to class actions. Here, too, there are both disparities and
similarities.
On the one hand, both the United States and Canada take a
broad, trans-substantive approach to representative relief in their
national courts.18 Furthermore, there are significant similarities in
the way which the two countries structure their class actions,
which is unsurprising given that many Canadian provinces
considered the U.S. approach to class relief when drafting their
own class action legislation.19
On the other hand, class actions in the United States and
Canada differ with respect to the sources of authority relating to
collective proceedings. Class actions in the United States are
asserted pursuant to the relevant rules of civil procedure at both
the state and federal level.20 This results in few, if any, difficulties
in creating national class actions, since the class action provisions
simply ride on the coattails of broad jurisdictional principles
reflected in other parts of the procedural law. For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that state courts have:
jurisdiction to certify a national class action as long as the
defendant has a sufficient connection to the forum state. The
plaintiff class can include . . . non-resident persons with no
connection to the forum state, provided they have been given
notice of their rights, an opportunity to opt out of the action, and
adequate representation by the representative plaintiffs.21

collective redress. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, SUBMISSION TO EUROPEAN COMMISSION
CONSULTATION ON COLLECTIVE REDRESS (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter IBA SUBMISSION],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/iba_awg_en.pdf;
INT’L BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR RECOGNISING AND ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter IBA GUIDELINES], available at
www.ibanet.org/LPP/Dispute_Resolution_sectionguidelines/Arbitration/Projects.aspx#.
18 See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 42-48; see also Pace, supra note 7, at 36-39.
19 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 10-15 (2000); Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 42.
20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Pace, supra note 7, at 36.
21 Hogg & McKee, supra note 11, at 291.
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Individual state courts are not the only possible venues for
class actions in the United States. The various U.S. federal courts
are also empowered to assert jurisdiction over parties from
multiple states and have done so in the class context.22
Interestingly, the importance of the federal system in the U.S.
class action regime has increased in recent years as a result of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which “liberalized the rules for
transferring state court class actions with interstate implications
into the federal courts.”23
Class actions in Canada stand on very different ground.
Rather than being authorized through the rules of civil procedure,
Canadian class actions are based almost entirely on statutory
provisions enacted by provincial and territorial legislatures.24
Because the precise wording of the statutes varies from province
to province, judicial opinions regarding procedural issues arising
in one province or territory may have little or no persuasive value
elsewhere in the nation, not only due to jurisdictional limitations
but also due to differences in the relevant statutory language or
underlying policy.25 To some extent, the Supreme Court of
Canada can provide a harmonizing influence, since the Court
“does not tolerate divergences in the common law from province
to province, or even divergences in the interpretation of similar
provincial statutes.”26 Nevertheless, leading commentators have
suggested that provinces that do not like the direction the Supreme
Court of Canada has taken with respect to a particular issue can
change the legal landscape in their territory through statutory
reform,27 which certainly has been the case in the area of class

See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 73.
Pace, supra note 7, at 39.
24 See id. at 48-49. Parties in provinces or territories that do not have class action
legislation can rely on certain common law authority regarding class relief, but this
procedure has been used in only very limited circumstances. See W. Canadian Shopping
Ctrs. Inc. v. Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.). Janet Walker has argued
that Dutton suggests a means by which Canadian courts can develop the law of class
actions beyond its statutory limitations by relying on certain provisions of the rules of
civil procedure, but it is unclear whether such an approach will be adopted. See Walker,
National, supra note 14, at 112.
25 See Pace, supra note 7, at 48-49.
26 HOGG, supra note 12, at 8-10.
27 See id.
22
23
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actions.28
This combination of limited jurisdictional competence and
local class action legislation has led class actions in Canada to
operate primarily on a local level.29 This can lead to a somewhat
fragmented approach to class action law and procedure, for
although provincial and territorial courts can occasionally use their
case management powers to coordinate actions when disputes
regarding the same subject matter are going forward in different
provinces, this sort of procedure has not seen widespread use.30
The localized nature of class actions in Canada can make it
difficult to undertake a detailed comparison to procedures used in
the United States, since each province or territory has adopted a
slightly different approach.31 However, certain broad-brush
observations can be made about the two nations’ class action
regimes.32
For example, U.S. federal courts faced with a potential class
action typically begin by considering whether certain prerequisites
to a class proceeding (such as numerosity, commonality,
representativeness and fairness) have been met.33 If these
elements exist, the court then considers whether the class suit can
be maintained, focusing on issues such as whether class relief
would create a risk of inconsistent judgments or dispose of the
rights of non-parties, or whether the opponent to the class has
acted on grounds applicable to the entire class.34 A class suit may
also be maintained in cases where commonality exists and:

28 For example, both Ontario and Quebec have made significant legislative changes
in response to certain judicial decisions regarding consumer class actions. See infra
notes 178, 191 and accompanying text.
29 See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 46.
30 See CAN. BAR ASS’N, supra note 11, at 4-6; Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 46.
However, the situation may change in the wake of recent protocols on multijurisdictional
class actions adopted by the C.B.A. See CAN. BAR ASS’N, supra note 11, at 11-15.
31 See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 42-48; Pace, supra note 7, at 36-39.
32 Compare Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 42-48, with Pace, supra note 7, at 3639.
33 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). State courts undertake similar analyses, but this
Article focuses on the federal system for ease of comparison.
34 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2566
n.8 (2011).
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a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.35

The Canadian analysis is remarkably similar, even across
provincial lines. Therefore, although:
[t]he details of the tests for certification differ in each
jurisdiction[] [, g]enerally speaking . . . five criteria must be
satisfied for the action to be certified:
 the pleadings must disclose a cause of action,
 there must be an identifiable class,
 the proposed representative must be appropriate,
 there must be common issues, and
 the class action must be the preferable procedure.36

Interestingly, it is this last element—the “preferability
analysis”—that varies the most from province to province. For
example, some jurisdictions leave the matter to the discretion of
the judge while other jurisdictions set forth a non-exhaustive list of
factors to be considered by the court.37 Quebec does not
specifically refer to “preferability” per se, but addresses many of
the same factors that other jurisdictions do in its class action
legislation.38 Notably, the concept that the “class action must be
the preferable procedure” is reminiscent of the requirement
contained in the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the
class action must be “superior to other available methods for the

35
36
37
38

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 43.
See id.
Id.
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fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”39
C. Arbitration Law
The final background matter to discuss involves arbitration
law. This issue is important for two reasons. First, a strong state
policy in favor of arbitration is typically necessary for the
development of class arbitration.40 Second, a state’s views about
the legitimacy of multiparty arbitration, even in the non-class
context, can influence the development of class arbitration in that
jurisdiction.41
As it turns out, both Canada and the United States exhibit
strong pro-arbitration policies through their statutory schemes.42
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) addresses
issues at the national level, with additional laws enacted at the
individual state level.43 However, the FAA has gained increasing
influence in recent years,44 although the FAA has never entirely
preempted state law.45
In Canada, the Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA) provides
guidance at the federal level, with provincial and territorial statutes
governing local matters.46 Arbitration law in Canada demonstrates
a high degree of national consistency, since the CAA and the
legislation from the common law provinces are both based on the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Kalajdzic et al., supra note 7, at 43.
See S.I. Strong, Class Arbitration Outside the United States: Reading the Tea
Leaves, in ARBITRATION AND MULTIPARTY CONTRACTS 183, 198-201 (Bernard Hanotiau
& Eric A. Schwartz eds., 2010) [hereinafter Strong, Tea Leaves].
41 See S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating
Internationally Enforceable Awards When Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of
Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1017, 1059-72 (2009)
[hereinafter Strong, Sounds of Silence].
42 See id.
43 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012).
44 This is due to expansive readings of what constitutes “commerce” under the
FAA. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56
(2003).
45 See Christopher R. Drahozal, State Law and International Arbitration, 2012 J.
DISP. RESOL. __ (forthcoming 2012).
46 See Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 17 (2d Supp.), am. R.S.C.
1985, ch. 1 (4th Supp.) (Can.), §§ 8-10; J. BRIAN CASEY & JANET MILLS, ARBITRATION
LAW OF CANADA: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 21, 30 (2005).
39
40
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(UNCITRAL) Model Arbitration Law.47 However, the Canadian
emphasis on provincial legislation and the limitation on federal
jurisdiction results in the CAA’s playing a relatively limited role
in arbitration in Canada.48
A second issue to consider involves how each state treats
multiparty arbitration, even outside the class context. The United
States has varied its approach somewhat over the years, first
taking an expansive view of the power of the court to order
multiparty arbitration, then pulling back from that position, only to
have a number of individual state legislatures subsequently adopt
laws that increased the ability of judges to order multiparty
proceedings.49 However, the debate in both the class and
traditional multiparty realm was transformed in 2003 as a result of
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial
Corporation v. Bazzle.50 That case, which has commonly been
understood as giving the arbitral tribunal the power to decide
whether class or multiparty proceedings are proper, made the issue
of multiparty arbitration largely, if not entirely, a question of
contract construction.51
Canada takes a somewhat more conservative approach,
restricting the ability of courts and arbitrators to consolidate
arbitral proceedings absent the agreement of all parties or the
statutory power to do so over the objection of a party. 52 However,
at least one Canadian commentator takes the view that a party who
See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, arts. 3436, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 18th Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc.
A/40/17 (June 21, 1985), revised by Revised Articles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, arts. 34-36, UNCITRAL, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/61/17 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. Quebec combines
its domestic and international arbitration in a single statute in the Code of Civil
Procedure (CCP), with certain additional matters embodied in the Quebec Civil Code
(CCQ). See BABAK BARIN ET AL., THE OSLER GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
CANADA 20-21 (2006).
48 See BARIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 17.
49 See Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide
Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 312-13
(2004) [hereinafter Buckner, Toward].
50 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
51 See id., at 444, 451-52; see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770-76 (2010) (casting doubt on Bazzle).
52 See CASEY & MILLS, supra note 46, at 96-97, 269-70.
47
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has agreed to an arbitral rule set that allows multiparty
proceedings based on the application of only one party may be
deemed to have consented to such proceedings.53
III.
Class Arbitration
The elements introduced in the preceding sections will be
revisited later in the Article, but it is now necessary to describe
class arbitration, a mechanism that has most often been used in the
context of domestic disputes in the United States. However, the
device has also been used in international matters54 and may be an
optimal means of overcoming some of the more intransigent
problems commonly associated with cross-border class actions.55
A. Class Arbitration Defined
Class arbitration—alternatively known as “class action
arbitration” or “classwide arbitration”—has been characterized as
a “‘uniquely American’ device,”56 and it is certainly true that the
procedure, as currently practiced and envisaged, explicitly imports
elements of U.S.-style class actions into the arbitral context,
resolving anywhere from dozens to hundreds of thousands of
individual claims in a single representative proceeding.57
Although class arbitration currently reflects a strong bias toward
U.S. conceptions of collective justice,58 other jurisdictions have
See BARIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 95-96.
At least three types of international class arbitration exist. See Strong, Sounds of
Silence, supra note 41, at 1021. Collective forms of international investment arbitration
have also been seen in the context of International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Dispute (ICSID) arbitration. See Abaclat Award, supra note 4, at 483-85.
55 See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the
Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 32-41 (2009). The concept of
international class arbitration may be particularly useful for those considering the
possibility of class arbitration involving parties from both Canada and the United States
since the device is most likely to be successful when the parties come from states that
share similar views on the availability and form of class relief. See S.I. Strong,
Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy
Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2008) [hereinafter Strong, Due Process].
56 The President and Fellows of Harvard College Against JSC Surgutneftegaz, 770
PLI/LIT.127, 155 (2008).
57 For a detailed description of procedures in class arbitration, see BERNARD
HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND
CLASS ACTIONS 257-79 (2005).
58 See S.I. Strong, From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class
53
54
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begun to develop related forms of class or collective relief, based
on their own domestic procedures regarding the provision of mass
relief for large-scale legal injuries.59
Class arbitration has been commonly used in consumer,
employment and healthcare disputes,60 but the device is not limited
to those fields. Instead, class arbitration mirrors the diversity of
judicial class actions and can involve a wide range of subject
matters ranging from insurance and financial disputes to maritime
and antitrust claims.61 The one notable difference is that class
arbitration has not yet been used in cases sounding exclusively in
tort, since parties to such disputes seldom have a pre-existing
contractual relationship and thus rarely have an arbitration
agreement in place at the time the legal injury arises.62 Although it
is theoretically conceivable that such parties could be joined
through a compromis or through existing principles of law
regarding non-signatories, the practical problems with such an
approach would be immense, and all known class arbitrations to
date have involved situations where every potential party to the
proceeding has a signed arbitration agreement covering the
dispute.63

Arbitration, 26 ARB. INT’L 493, 494 (2010).
59 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
60 See Brief of Am. Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 22-24, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 081198) [hereinafter AAA Brief].
61 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764-65
(2010); Buckner, Toward, supra note 49, at 301; Christopher R. Drahozal, New
Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233,
250-55 (2006).
62 However, there is room for development in this regard. See S.I. Strong, Mass
Torts and Arbitration: Lessons From Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, in UNCERTAINTY
AND MASS TORT: CAUSATION AND PROOF (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong,
Lessons from Abaclat].
63 See S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?
Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEG. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, First Principles]. However, it has not been
impossible to obtain large-scale post-dispute agreements in the context of ICSID
arbitration, as has been seen by the recent Abaclat decision on jurisdiction. See Abaclat
Award, supra note 4, ¶¶ 501-02; Strong, Lessons from Abaclat, supra note 62. However,
that procedure was assisted by the fact that treaty-based arbitration is considered to
constitute an offer of arbitration that is subsequently accepted by the individual
investors. See Abaclat Award, supra note 4, ¶¶ 467-92 (discussing consent to collective
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B. The Development of Class Arbitration
Class arbitration developed in the United States as a result of a
unique confluence of facts: a strong public policy in favor of class
relief; a robust view of arbitration as a legitimate means of
resolving disputes; and an overarching need to maintain a
consistent response to mass legal injuries, regardless of the forum
chosen for hearing those claims.64 It has been suggested that these
elements must be in place before class or collective arbitration can
develop in other jurisdictions.65
However, class arbitration also owes its existence to the U.S.
corporate community’s opposition to judicial class actions66 and
the belief, prevalent in the late 1980s and 1990s, that arbitration
would eliminate the possibility of class suits by forcing claimants
to resolve their claims individually.67
However, corporate
defendants were in for something of a surprise. When class claims
were asserted in cases involving arbitration agreements, as they
inevitably were, the disputes were not automatically sent to
bilateral arbitration. Instead, judges viewed the situation as

procedures). However, the dissent in that case had significant issues with the way in
which the majority interpreted the treaties. See Abaclat Dissent, supra note 4, ¶¶ 120273; Strong, Lessons from Abaclat, supra note 62.
64 See Strong, Tea Leaves, supra note 40, at 197-205.
65 See, e.g., Abaclat Award, supra note 4; Strong, Tea Leaves, supra note 40, at 1.
There may be good reason for preferring class arbitrations to class actions, but more
analysis is needed on this point. Some initial thoughts can be found in AAA Brief, supra
note 60, at 24 (regarding relative speed of class litigation and arbitration); Dana H.
Freyer & Gregory A. Litt, Desirability of International Class Arbitration, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION:
THE FORDHAM PAPERS 171 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008); Hans Smit, Class Actions and
Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 199, 210-12 (2004); Strong,
Lessons from Abaclat, supra note 62; S.I. Strong, Class and Collective Relief in the
Cross-Border Context: A Possible Role for the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23
HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 2010, 113 (2011) [hereinafter Strong, PCA].
66 Class actions were and are commonly seen by the business community as risky,
expensive and frivolous, despite empirical evidence suggesting that most class litigation
is not without merit. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as
Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 85 (2008).
67 See Michael R. Davis, The Prospective [sic] of In-House Counsel: Organization,
Compliance/Enforcement Programs, Negotiated Sales, Transfer, Termination and
Advertising and Franchisee Sales, 486 PLI/COMM. 561, 590 (1989); Jean R. Sternlight,
Should an Arbitration Provision Trump the Class Action?, 8 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 13
(2002).
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presenting several different possibilities.68 On the one hand, a
court faced with this dilemma might give precedence to one form
of dispute resolution over another (either arbitration over class
actions or class actions over arbitration).69 On the other hand, a
court might find a way to harmonize the two processes in some
way on, the ground that they were not mutually inconsistent.70 As
time went, an increasing number of judges chose to adopt the latter
of the two alternatives, resulting in the creation of an entirely new
form of dispute resolution: class arbitration.71
Although the mechanism originally developed as a common
law, judge-made device,72 it is unclear whether this older model is
still in use73 following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.74 Not only did that decision
give implicit approval to the device, it led several U.S.-based
arbitral institutions to promulgate specialized rules on class
arbitration.75 The two rule sets currently in use—the American
Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitration (AAA Supplementary Rules)76 and the JAMS Class
Action Procedures77—are very similar to one another, which is

68 See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206-10 (Cal. 1982), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
69 See id.
70 See id.; see also Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866-67
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
71 See Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 785-86 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998); Dickler, 596 A.2d at 867.
72 See Blue Cross of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785-86; Dickler, 596 A.2d at 867;
Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360-61 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S.
444 (2003); Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185,
226-39 (2006) [hereinafter Buckner, Due Process].
73 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)
(discussing only procedures under AAA Supplementary Rules); Buckner, Toward, supra
note 49, at 301 (claiming the hybrid model has been “swept away”).
74 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 444.
75 See Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, AM. ARB. ASS’N. (Oct. 8, 2003),
[hereinafter AAA Supplementary Rules], available at www.adr.org/ (select the “Rules &
Procedures” hyperlink; then select the “Rules” hyperlink); JAMS Class Action
Procedures, effective May 1, 2009, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-classaction-procedures/.
76 See AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75
77 See JAMS Class Action Procedures, supra note 75.
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unsurprising given that both were intentionally modeled on Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so as to allow courts
and arbitrators to rely on existing case law when construing the
provisions of the new arbitral rules.78 Since 2003, over 300 class
arbitrations have been filed with one arbitral institution alone,79 a
figure that is roughly similar to the number of international
investment arbitrations filed with the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in the last forty
years.80
Despite class arbitration’s lengthy presence on the U.S. legal
stage, “[n]o statute, state or federal, prescribes the rules or
procedures for class arbitrations to ensure that the process is
uniform, fair, or efficient. Moreover, whether any level of court
involvement is required—or even permissible—is an open
question.”81 The issue of judicial involvement has become
particularly contentious in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.,82 as further discussed below.83
Some commentators believe that class arbitration suffered a
fatal blow as a result of Stolt-Nielsen and another recent Supreme
Court decision, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.84 However,

78 See Meredith W. Nissen, Class Action Arbitrations: AAA vs. JAMS: Different
Approaches to a New Concept, 11 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 19 (2005).
79 See Class Arbitration Case Docket, AM. ARB. ASS’N, available at www.adr.org/
(under the “services” heading” select the “Class Arbitration Case Docket” hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
80 See
ICSID
Cases,
available
at
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases
(listing 140 cases as currently pending and 229 as concluded).
81 Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1723 (2006).
82 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1759 (2010).
83 See infra notes 194-222 and accompanying text.
84 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). AT&T struck a
California law making certain types of class waivers unconscionable. See id. at 1753;
Sarah Cole, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds—Major Victory for Business, ADR PROF
BLOG (Apr. 27, 2010), www.indisputably.org/?p=1268; Editorial, Gutting Class Action,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011 [hereinafter Gutting Class Action], available at
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html ; Jean Sternlight, Sternlight on StoltNielsen
v.
AnimalFeeds,
ADR
PROF
BLOG
(Apr.
29,
2010),
www.indisputably.org/?p=1287.
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the opinions are perhaps better viewed as opening the door to a
great deal of ancillary litigation as parties attempt to define the
outer bounds of the procedure.85 Indeed, numerous cases that have
arisen in the wake of the two decisions have already suggested that
the effect of these two precedents will be relatively limited.86
Furthermore, a large-scale arbitral action brought by AT&T
customers against AT&T subsequent to the Supreme Court
decision in AT&T suggests that plaintiffs’ counsel will find new
ways of asserting the power of collective redress.87
It is also possible that Stolt-Nielsen and AT&T will inspire
Congress to exclude certain types of class claims from
arbitration.88 However, this will not eliminate class arbitration in
the United States because class claims can arise in contexts that
will not be not covered by the proposed legislation.89
Class arbitration has not yet been formally adopted in Canada,
although Canadian authorities have contemplated the procedure at
See Philip J. Loree Jr., Stolt-Nielsen Delivers a New FAA Rule—And Then
Federalizes the Law of Contracts, 28 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LIT. 121, 121-25
(June 2010); S.I. Strong, Opening More Doors Than It Closes: Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp., 2010 LLOYD’S MARIT. & COMM. L. Q. 565, 566-68
[hereinafter Strong, Doors].
86 See Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 125-27 (2d Cir. 2011); In re
Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 194, 199 (2d Cir. 2011).
87 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Martha Neil,
After Supreme Court Win Forcing Customers to Arbitrate, AT&T Now Sues to Stop the
Arbitration,
ABA
J.
ONLINE
(Aug.
17,
2011),
www.abajournal.com/news/article/after_supreme_court_win_requiring_customers_to_ar
bitrate_att_now_tries/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=wee
kly_email [hereinafter Neil]. Ultimately the U.S. Department of Justice stepped in to
address the proposed merger, giving AT&T some practical relief from the arbitrations
but leaving the question open as to whether a respondent can seek judicial relief from
multiple arbitrations after having included a class arbitration waiver in its contracts. See
Juliana Gruenwald, Justice Department Gives AT&T Merger Plan Zero Bars, NAT’L J.
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/justice-department-gives-at-tmerger-plan-zero-bars-20110831; see also Abaclat Award, supra note 4, ¶ 537 (stating
that “not only would it be cost prohibitive for many Claimants to file individual claims
but it would also be practically impossible for ICSID to deal separately with 60,000
individual arbitrations”).
88 See Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987.IS, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness
Act, H.R. 1873.IH, 112th Cong. (2011) (regarding consumer and employment claims).
89 See Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987.IS, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness
Act, H.R. 1873.IH, 112th Cong. (2011) (regarding consumer and employment claims);
Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 41, at 1018-19.
85
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both the legislative and judicial levels.90 However, a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada—Seidel v. Telus
Communications, Inc.,91 further discussed below—may be seen as
having a chilling effect on the further development of the device,
at least as a matter of the common law. This is not to say that
courts in Canada are foreclosed from considering use of the
device, particularly since the localized nature of Canadian class
action and arbitration statutes means that precedent—even from
the Supreme Court—may not be followed elsewhere in the
nation.92 However, the court in Seidel was asked to construe
legislation from British Columbia, which is one of the provinces
that has traditionally been most receptive to the concept of class
arbitration, which bodes ill for judicial development of the
device.93
Of course, it is always possible that class arbitration in Canada
will develop through legislative means. In fact, Manitoba has
already considered that possibility, and at least one judge has
called for other provincial legislatures to consider the matter. 94
Alternatively, parties could expressly consent to class arbitration,
an approach that has not yet been tried in Canada. 95 In this,
Canada might follow the lead of Germany, which developed a new
form of collective arbitration following a judgment by the German
Federal Court of Justice in 2009 declaring shareholder disputes
arbitrable.96 Later that year, the German Arbitration Institute
(DIS) promulgated a specialized set of arbitral procedures to
90 See Man. Law Reform Comm’n, Report 115, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
and Consumer Class Proceedings 3-4, 22-23 (Apr. 2008); Leon et al., supra note 2, at
386-98; Geneviève Saumier, Consumer Arbitration in the Evolving Canadian
Landscape, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1203, 1215-22 (2009).
91 Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.).
92 See supra notes 24-39 and 47-53 accompanying text.
93 See Leon et al., supra note 2, at 390-92; infra notes 169-178 and accompanying
text.
94 See Man. Law Reform Comm’n, supra note 90, at 3-4, 22-23; MacKinnon v.
Nat’l Money Mart Co., 2009 BCCA 103, ¶ 14 (relating to British Columbia).
95 There are some good reasons why parties might prefer class arbitration to class
litigation. See Strong, PCA, supra note 65, 115-17; Strong, Lessons from Abaclat, supra
note 62.
96 See S v. M, Case No. II ZR 255/08 (German Federal Court of Justice) Apr. 6,
2009, Kriendler Digest for ITA Board of Reporters, available at
www.kluwerarbitration.com.
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govern disputes of this nature.97 Canadian arbitration institutions
might follow a similar course of action and develop their own set
of rules to be adopted by parties by consent.98
Interestingly, at least three of the same motivating factors that
existed in the United States prior to the adoption of class
arbitration currently exist in Canada: a strong public policy in
favor of class relief, a robust view of arbitration as a legitimate
means of resolving disputes, and a proliferation of arbitration
agreements in contexts where class suits are common.99 Canadian
parties may also experience a heightened need for class arbitration
because of the difficulties associated with the creation of multijurisdictional class actions in Canadian courts.100 However, it is
unclear whether Canada will take the view that there is an
overarching need to maintain a consistent response to mass legal
injuries, regardless of the forum chosen for hearing those
claims.101
C. The Importance of Class Arbitration Domestically and
Internationally
As the preceding discussion suggests, class arbitration stands
in a very interesting position. Maligned by corporate interests and
by members of the bench and bar,102 class arbitration is seldom

See DIS Supplementary Rules, supra note 4; Strong, DIS, supra note 4, at 147.
Alternatively, Canadian parties who wish to proceed in class arbitration could
rely on provisions found in procedural rules promulgated by international arbitral
institutions. Both the AAA Supplementary Rules and the JAMS Class Action
Procedures would be suitable for use in Canada. See infra notes 234-246.
99 See Strong, Tea Leaves, supra note 40, at 1; Jacob Ziegel, Class Actions to
Remedy Mass Consumer Wrongs: Repugnant Solution or Controllable Genie? The
Canadian Experience, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 879, 890 (2008).
100 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
101 See Strong, Tea Leaves, supra note 40, at 5. The recent protocols on multijurisdictional class actions in Canada have suggested the need to coordinate class actions
proceeding in different provinces so as to avoid inconsistent or conflicting decisions.
See CAN. BAR ASS’N, supra note 11, at 8. However, these protocols are only advisory
and do not have the force of law.
102 See P. Christine Deruelle & Robert Clayton Roesch, Gaming the Rigged Class
Arbitration Game: How We Got Here and Where We Go Now, 15 METRO. CORP.
COUNS.
(Aug.
2007),
available
at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/August/09.pdf; Smit, supra note 65, at 21011.
97
98
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defended as an optimal means of resolving large-scale disputes,
despite the possibility that class arbitration might in fact provide
parties with a better outcome or procedure.103 However, class
arbitration has a unique and potentially important role to play in
both the domestic and international spheres.
Class arbitration’s place in the domestic realm is already well
established.104 Indeed, most class arbitrations filed to date have
involved domestic, rather than cross-border, disputes.105 With
hundreds of known class arbitrations having been filed,106 class
arbitration has shown itself to be entirely capable of addressing
large-scale domestic disputes, either because the procedures that
are now used in most class arbitrations are already familiar to the
parties due to similarities to the procedural rules used in judicial
class actions or because class arbitration appears to serve many of
the same ends as judicial class actions.107 Although the United
States is by far the largest user of large-scale domestic arbitration,
other jurisdictions have also considered adopting such
procedures.108
Although class arbitration is most likely to be seen in domestic
matters, it may be particularly well-suited to address international
disputes.109 Large-scale cross-border disputes are one of the
biggest issues facing the international legal community today, 110
and class or collective arbitration is uniquely placed to provide
parties from different states with the opportunity to resolve their
claims at a single time and in a single, neutral venue, not only
helping parties obtain justice more quickly and efficiently but also
overcoming problems associated with obtaining jurisdiction over

See Strong, PCA, supra note 65, 139-40.
See Class Arbitration Case Docket, supra note 79.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 28-31 (2000).
108 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 3, 14-15.
110 See European Commission, supra note 17; ABA, supra note 16, at 1-4; CAN.
BAR ASS’N, supra note 11, at 1; IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 17, ¶ 3; JONATHAN HILL,
CROSS-BORDER CONSUMER CONTRACTS 6-8 (2008); Adeboyejo, supra note 16
(concerning Canadian-U.S. cross-border protocols); Nagareda, supra note 55, at 20-28.
103
104

STRONGEDIT7.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

RESOLVING MASS LEGAL DISPUTES

5/6/2012 4:23 PM

943

parties from a variety of states.111 Notably, arbitration’s ability to
obtain jurisdiction over a geographically diverse group of
individuals may also influence the development of domestic class
arbitration in states (such as Canada) that face legal obstacles to
multi-jurisdictional class actions.
Furthermore, arbitral awards are much easier to enforce
internationally than civil judgments.112 Difficulties in enforcement
have been particularly acute in cases involving class relief,113 since
some nations view representative actions as jurisprudentially
unsound.114 To the extent that some nations may categorically
refuse to recognize any judgment arising out of a judicial class
action, arbitration may be the best or only alternative for obtaining
or providing class relief from or to parties resident in those
jurisdictions.115
IV.
Class Arbitration Compared
Having laid the necessary groundwork, it is now possible to
compare the way class arbitration is considered in the United
States and Canada. Given the known differences in how the two
countries contemplate the device, a comprehensive comparison of
every aspect of the mechanism is inappropriate. Nevertheless, it
can be useful to discuss three specific issues that are particularly
amenable to comparative analysis: the circumstances in which
See Nagareda, supra note 55, at 32-41; Strong, PCA, supra note 65.
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7-10, 19 (2009).
113 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975); John
C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in England of a U.S. Class Action Settlement, 46
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 134, 136, 140 (1997); Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class Action Judgment
Enforcement in Italy: Procedural “Due Process” Requirements, 10 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 5, 19, 25-26 (2002). The IBA has issued guidelines to assist in the recognition
of judgments arising out of cross-border collective actions, but these procedures are only
advisory. See IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 17.
114 This bias is based on the view that the right to pursue and defend against a legal
claim is individual in nature. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group
Litigation in Switzerland, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 301, 310-11 (2007); Richard B.
Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary
Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217, 233 (1992); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in
Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 344-50, 385-86
(2003).
115 Although public policy could be used as a means of blocking enforcement of a
class award, there are restrictions on the type of public policy that may be relied upon.
See Strong, Due Process, supra note 55, at 75-93.
111
112
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class arbitration is available; the procedures that must or may be
used; and the proper description of the nature of the right to
proceed as a class. This analysis will not only help those parties or
institutions (in Canada or elsewhere) who wish to develop their
own forms of class or collective arbitration, it will also help give
those in the United States a new perspective on particularly
intransigent problems. Each issue is considered separately below.
A. When Is Class Arbitration Available?
1. United States
The first issue to address involves the circumstances in which
class arbitration is available. In the United States, parties must
first demonstrate existence of an arbitration agreement between
the parties, created either before or after the dispute arose.116
There can be either one agreement binding all the parties or a
series of bilateral agreements between each of the claimants and
the respondent.117 In the latter case, the documents must each
include “an arbitration clause which is substantially similar to that
signed by the class representative(s) and each of the other class
members.”118
Once it is established that the parties agreed to arbitrate their
dispute, it is necessary to consider the procedure that will be used
to resolve the matter. Here, there are several possible alternatives.
For example, the agreement(s) in question will either (1) include
language expressly contemplating the possibility of class or
multiparty treatment or (2) be silent or ambiguous on that point.119
If the agreement contains an express provision allowing class
arbitration, that language will be given effect. 120 If the agreement
contains an express prohibition of class arbitration (i.e., a waiver
of class treatment), then it is necessary to consider whether the
waiver is effective.121 This issue was recently considered by the

See Strong, First Principles, supra note 63, at 4 n. 9.
See id. at 23-24.
118 AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75, rule 4(a)(6).
119 See HANOTIAU, supra note 57, at 104-05.
120 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769 (2010);
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003) (Breyer, J.).
121 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
116
117

STRONGEDIT7.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

RESOLVING MASS LEGAL DISPUTES

5/6/2012 4:23 PM

945

U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.122
AT&T considered whether a state law indicating that certain
types of class waivers would be struck as unconscionable was
consistent with the FAA.123 A strongly divided Court (5-4) upheld
the waiver, based on the finding that the state law acted as a
hindrance to arbitration, contrary to the pro-arbitration policy
embodied in the FAA.124 In so doing, the majority appeared to
operate on the assumption that class arbitration was in some way
fundamentally different from bilateral arbitration, a conclusion
that was challenged by the four dissenting justices.125
Although AT&T has been heralded as marking the end of both
class arbitration and class actions in the United States (since it is
believed that the vast majority of corporate defendants will now
use arbitration agreements in conjunction with class waivers to
eviscerate class suits in both court and arbitration),126 that
conclusion appears to be somewhat precipitous. First, litigation
will likely arise as parties challenge specific language in various
waivers. Second, AT&T only addressed matters arising under state
law.127
Not only have federal courts already indicated a
willingness to strike waivers on other grounds, including public
policy,128 but state courts may also find ways of evading AT&T, as
has occurred in other contexts.129
Another alternative is that the arbitration agreement is silent or
ambiguous as to the possibility of class treatment, a situation that

Id.
Id.
124 Id. at 1753.
125 Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This issue is discussed in detail in Strong,
First Principles, supra note 63.
126 See Gutting Class Action, supra note 84. Indeed, AT&T has already raised this
argument in the context of a large-scale effort to mount multiple arbitrations following
the Supreme Court decision in early 2011. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Neil, supra note 87.
127 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
128 See Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 125-27 (2d Cir. 2011); see also
In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 194, 199 (2d Cir. 2011).
129 See Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 101 (Tex. 2011) (allowing
heightened review of an award under the Texas Arbitration Act despite the decision in
Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
455 (2011).
122
123
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is relatively common.130 This issue was considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.131 Although the decision leaves a great many questions
unanswered,132 it does clearly state that the issue of whether class
arbitration is proper must be determined by reference to the
parties’ intent, even in cases of contractual silence or ambiguity.133
The logical question, of course, is how the necessary intent is to be
demonstrated if the agreement is silent or ambiguous.
Some commentators have suggested that Stolt-Nielsen requires
parties to show express consent to class arbitration.134 This
conclusion appears to be based on language in the majority
opinion indicating that “we see the question as being whether the
parties agreed to authorize class arbitration” and that “[a]n
implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration . . . is not a
term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”135
However, the quoted language does not go as far as these
commentators suggest. Instead, these statements appear to be
limited to the proposition that class arbitration cannot be ordered
based on nothing more than the decision to arbitrate. That,
however, has never been the case in any type of multiparty
arbitration.136
Instead, Stolt-Nielsen is better read as holding that consent to
class procedures can be demonstrated implicitly.137 Support for
this proposition can be found in language indicating that when the
parties have not “reached any agreement on the issue of class
arbitration, the arbitrators’ proper task [is] to identify the rule of

130 Silence or ambiguity can arise either because the parties have failed to address
the matter or because a waiver of class proceedings has been struck and severed by a
court or arbitral tribunal.
131 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010).
132 See Loree, supra note 85; Strong, Doors, supra note 85, at 566-68.
133 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
134 See Cole, supra note 84; see also Sternlight, supra note 84.
135 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
136 See Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 41, at 1059-83.
137 See Martin Platte, When Should an Arbitrator Join Cases?, 18 ARB. INT’L 67,
68-70 (2002); see also Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of
“Consent,” 24 ARB. INT’L 199, 243-45 (2008).
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law that governs in that situation.”138 This statement obviously
negates the proposition that the parties must expressly consent to
class arbitration, since there would be no need to identify the
applicable rule of law to determine that issue if consent had to be
express. Therefore, class arbitration continues to be available in
the United States even in cases involving implicit consent.
The problem is that the Supreme Court failed to give any clear
guidance on what must be shown in the way of implicit consent,
instead explicitly (and inexplicably) stating that it had “no
occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a finding
that the parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration.”139
However, the majority did suggest that in this instance recourse
might properly have been had “either to the FAA itself or to one of
the two bodies of law that the parties claimed were governing, i.e.,
either federal maritime law or New York law.”140
Stolt-Nielsen therefore suggests that the question of what
procedure should be used in a putative class arbitration is a matter
of contract interpretation that remains subject to the same kind of
analysis that had previously been used in cases involving class and
other types of multiparty arbitration.141 This process involves
consideration of the language contained in the agreement between
the parties as well as the governing law and arbitral rules so as to
determine whether the parties have demonstrated the requisite
consent to multiparty or class proceedings.142 In undertaking this
analysis, arbitrators typically rely on three interpretive rules that:
are the same as the general principles frequently adopted with
respect to all contracts.
They include the principle of
interpretation in good faith (A), the principle of effective
interpretation (B) and the principle of interpretation contra
proferentem (C). However, the principles of strict interpretation
(D) and of interpretation in favorem validitatis (E) should

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768.
Id. at 1776 n.10.
140 Id. at 1768.
141 See Strong, First Principles, supra note 63.
142 See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION ¶ 16-18 (2003); Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 41, at 1059-83.
138
139
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not . . . apply.143

The technique is similar to that used in cases involving
pathological clauses, which raise issues of intent that are similar to
those found in multiparty scenarios.144 In both cases, the principle
of effective interpretation is used to give effect to the parties’ clear
desire to arbitrate their disputes, even if the precise procedures to
be used are inelegantly or insufficiently described in the
agreement to arbitrate.145 This approach is said to be preferable to
strict contractual interpretation, which is “based on the idea that an
arbitration agreement constitutes an exception to the principle of
the jurisdiction of the courts, and that, as laws of exception are
strictly interpreted, the same should apply to arbitration
agreements.”146 This view is not consistent with the notion that
arbitration is a reputable means of resolving a wide variety of
disputes.147
2. Canada
Canada takes a very different stance than the United States
does when it comes to the availability of class arbitration.148 No
Canadian court has yet ordered class arbitration,149 nor has an
arbitral tribunal sitting in Canada done so on its own authority. 150

EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 476 (1998) (citation omitted) [hereinafter
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN]; see also Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 41, at
1055-83.
144 See Benjamin G. Davis, Pathological Clauses: Frédéric Eisemann’s Still Vital
Criteria, 7 ARB. INT’L 365, 365-66 (1991).
145 See Strong, First Principles, supra note 63, at 59-62 (describing the treatment of
procedural formalities in AT&T and Stolt-Nielsen).
146 FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 143, ¶ 480.
147 Id.
148 See Strong, First Principles, supra note 63, at 59-62; see also CASEY & MILLS,
supra note 46, at 97, 269-70.
149 Though the Supreme Court of Canada comes close in Dell Computer Corp. v.
Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, para. 87 (Can.), the
Court did not “explicitly endorse” class arbitration. Jan-Kyzysztof Dunin-Wasowicz,
Collective Redress in International Arbitration: An American Idea, a European
Concept?, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 285, 290 (2011); see also infra notes 165-68 and
accompanying text.
150 See Jonnette Watson Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses:
143
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However, the stage may be set for just such a development, at least
in some provinces.151
This conclusion is based on similarities between certain
decisions recently rendered by Canadian courts and the United
States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle.152 Bazzle is commonly understood to stand for the
proposition that arbitrators, rather than the court, are typically to
decide the issue of whether an arbitration agreement permits class
treatment.153 This approach facilitated the development of class
arbitration by eliminating what has been called the “lack of
power” argument.154
The “lack of power” debate dates back to the years prior to
Bazzle, when judges were the only ones who could decide whether
class treatment was appropriate.155 However, opponents to class
arbitration claimed that courts lacked the power “to certify an
individual plaintiff as a class representative for other parties whose
claims [were] subject to arbitration, lack[ed] express authority to
consolidate arbitration proceedings, and lack[ed] authority to
apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in class arbitration.”156
Part of the strength of this argument lay in the fact that the FAA
and many state statutes either were silent on the issue of courtordered consolidation or indicated that consolidation of
arbitrations was only possible with the unanimous consent of the
parties.157
Notably, similar issues could arise in Canadian jurisdictions
where the applicable arbitration statute limits the power of the
court to order multiparty proceedings over the objection of one or
Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL L.J. 693, 703-719 (2006).
151 The Supreme Court decision in Seidel has limited the likelihood that such
developments will take place in British Columbia. See Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns Inc.,
[2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, paras. 33-42 (Can.) (concluding that class action legislation barred
arbitration of claims arising under the statute).
152 See 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
153 See id. at 451-53 (Breyer, J.). The U.S. Supreme Court recently cast doubt on
the common understanding of Bazzle, but did not provide an alternate reading. See StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770-72 (2010).
154 See Buckner, Toward, supra note 49, at 312.
155 See id. at 227-31; see also Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 41, at 1026-29.
156 Buckner, supra note 49, at 312.
157 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012); Buckner, supra note 49, at 312-13.
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more of the parties.158 Indeed, some people believe that, as a
matter of Canadian law, “[t]here is no power in an arbitrator,
absent an agreement of all parties, to order a consolidation of
arbitration.”159 However, at least one Canadian commentator has
taken the position that parties who agree to arbitral rules that allow
the arbitral tribunal to order multiparty proceedings based on the
application of only one party may be deemed to have agreed to
multiparty arbitration, which suggests some opportunity for the
development of class proceedings.160 Furthermore, restrictions on
consolidated arbitrations may not be applicable to class arbitration
because the two procedures are not entirely analogous.161
The significance of Bazzle lies in the way it places the concept
of competence-competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) into the realm
of class arbitration.162 Interestingly, the Canadian Supreme Court
may have enunciated its own version of this principle in Dell
Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs,163 which involved a
consumer dispute that was initially brought as a judicial class
action.164 In deciding whether to stay the court proceedings in
favor of arbitration, Justice Deschamps, writing for the majority,
stated:
First of all, I would lay down a general rule that in any case
involving an arbitration clause, a challenge to the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction must be resolved first by the arbitrator. A court
should depart from the rule of systematic referral to arbitration
only if the challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is based

158 For example, British Columbia’s International Commercial Arbitration Act
requires parties “to have agreed on consolidation in their arbitration agreements.” BARIN
ET AL., supra note 47, at 94; see British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, s. 27(2).
159 CASEY & MILLS, supra note 46, at 97, 269-70.
160 BARIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 95-96.
161 See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
162 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
163 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.).
164 See id. para. 87. In its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the principle of
competence-competence is reflected in the Model Arbitration Law, suggesting that
provincial courts might come to a similar conclusion under their own statutes, given the
influence of the Model Arbitration Law throughout the nation. See id. para. 74; supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
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solely on a question of law. . . .
. . . If the challenge requires the production and review of factual
evidence, the court should normally refer the case to arbitration,
as arbitrators have, for this purpose, the same resources and
expertise as courts. Where questions of mixed law and fact are
concerned, the court hearing the referral application must refer
the case to arbitration unless the questions of fact require only
superficial consideration of the documentary evidence in the
record.165

This language suggests a good deal of confidence in the
abilities of the arbitral tribunal and might be used to support the
view that arbitral tribunals are competent to make decisions about
class arbitration in Canada. This is particularly true to the extent
that the question of the propriety of class arbitration in Canada can
be framed as a contractual issue focusing on the question of intent
and involving a mixed question of fact and law.166 Furthermore,
this approach is consistent with basic principles of arbitration law
recognizing that arbitrators are competent to determine their own
jurisdiction167 and have wide discretion to shape arbitral
proceedings, subject only to the expressed and permissible wishes
of the parties.168
Justice Deschamps reiterated this point along with Justice
LeBel when dissenting in Seidel, a case that saw the Supreme
Court strongly divided in 5-4 split.169 However, Seidel was
Dell, 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, paras. 84-85 (emphasis added).
Certainly in the United States “[t]he job of interpreting the parties’ intent . . .
implicates mixed questions of fact and law, as well as evaluation of industry custom and
practice, [and] has always been entrusted to the arbitrators.” William W. Park,
Determining an Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction: Timing and Finality in American Law, 8 NEV.
L.J. 135, 163 n.113 (2007). This appears to be the case in several Canadian provinces as
well. See British Columbia v. Gibson Pass Resort, Inc., 2009 BCSC 96, paras. 1-15
(considering several provincial decisions).
167 See Bernard Hanotiau, Groups of Companies in International Arbitration, in
PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 279, 292 (Loukas A. Mistelis et
al. eds., 2006).
168 See Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara, 2004 ABQB 918, para. 36 (Can.); see also FOUCHARD, GAILLARD,
GOLDMAN, supra note 143, para. 1238.
169 See Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, para. 66 (Can.) (LeBel
165
166
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somewhat different from Dell in that one of the major issues, at
least for the dissent, was whether an arbitral tribunal had the same
power as a court to issue injunctive or declaratory relief.170 The
four dissenting justices held that tribunals did have such powers
under the British Columbia consumer protection statute, while the
majority held the opposite, based on a different reading of the
statutory powers granted to arbitrators by the legislature.171
Although the dissent does not discuss class arbitration per se, the
device might have been within the contemplation of the dissenting
justices, who noted that:
it must be determined, as a matter of law, what rights, benefits
and protections are found in s.172 [of the Business Practices and
Consumer Protection Act]. . . . In answering this question of
law, we are of the view that means are just a way to attain an
end. The remedy is the end, and the same remedies, and perhaps
others as well, can be obtained through the arbitration process as
they can through the public court system. . . . What is important
here is that the adjudicator has jurisdiction to make a declaration
or order an injunction, which are the same remedies as are
contemplated in s.172.172
& Deschamps, JJ., dissenting).
170 See id. para. 85.
171 See id. ¶¶ 55, 146; see also James Sullivan and Sara Knowles, SCC Clarifies
Role of Arbitration/Mediation Clauses in Class Actions, BLAKES (Apr. 14, 2011),
www.blakes.ca/english/view_printer_bulletin.asp?ID=4704.
172 Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, para. 142 (LeBel &
Deschamps, JJ., dissenting). The remedies in question involved the ability to make a
declaration under section 172(1)(a) or an interim or permanent injunction under Section
172(1)(b) of the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act. See id. para. 141.
Either of these remedies would have a class-type effect, not because they would bind
third parties, but because they would bind Telus. See id. para. 150. However, since the
order would not affect the third parties’ rights, it would not act to their detriment and
would therefore be permissible in the dissenters’ minds. See id. para. 150. Notably, the
Supreme Court of Canada had to have been aware of the existence of class arbitration as
a possible procedural device, having considered authorities that were introduced on that
point. See id. para. 23 (Binnie, J.) (citing Frédéric Bachand, Should No-Class Action
Arbitration Clauses Be Enforced?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS, supra note 65, at
153). Notably, although remedies provided for in Section 171 may have class effect,
class remedies are also explicitly provided for in Section 172(2) of the Business
Practices and Consumer Protection Act. See Business Practices and Consumer
Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2, § 172(2) (Can.).
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The dissenting justices also focused on the use of the word “may”
in section 172, concluding that this “makes it even clearer that the
Supreme Court is not intended to be the only forum in which these
remedies can be sought.”173
Alternatively, the majority in Seidel focused on the fact that
“[t]he policy objectives of s. 172 would not be well served by lowprofile, private and confidential arbitrations where consumers of a
particular product may have little opportunity to connect with
other consumers who may share their experience and complaints
and seek vindication through a well-publicized court action.”174
This suggests that the majority was only considering the difference
between a class action in court and a bilateral arbitration. This is
further demonstrated by language indicating that:
it can hardly be denied that arbitrators, who derive their
jurisdiction by virtue of the parties’ contract, cannot order relief
that would bind third parties, or that only superior courts have
the authority to grant declarations and injunctions enforceable
against the whole world. Ms. Seidel does not seek remedies
applicable only between her and TELUS but between TELUS
and the whole world. Provided TELUS complied with any order
in relation to Ms. Seidel, it could carry on as before in relation to
TELUS customers who are not parties to the arbitration and are
therefore unaffected by its outcome, just as a successful defence
by TELUS against Ms. Seidel’s complaint would not create in
its favour a precedent in future arbitrations raising the same or
similar complaints.175

Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Seidel
demonstrated the same definitional split that the U.S. Supreme
173 Seidel, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, para. 154 (LeBel & Deschamps, JJ., dissenting); see
also Sultana L. Bennett, Supreme Court of Canada Allows the Pursuit of a Class Action
Despite a Contractual Mandatory Arbitration Clause, STIKEMAN ELLIOTT (Apr. 20,
2011), www.stikeman.com (select “English” hyperlink; then select “publications”
hyperlink; and select page two).
174 Seidel, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, para. 37 (Binnie, J.).
175 Id. para. 39; see also supra text accompanying note 172 (discussing the
dissenting justices’ views about the scope of the arbitrators’ powers vis-à-vis third
parties).
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Court did in AT&T, namely whether class arbitration constitutes a
form of arbitration that should be given equal consideration as
bilateral arbitration.176 While the two countries engage in this
debate in slightly different ways, the underlying concerns are
similar. Thus, both countries would likely benefit from a more
transparent discussion about the nature of arbitration and the
extent to which class arbitration falls within previously established
norms.177
Although the decisions in Dell and Seidel are important, their
precedential value may be limited as a result of factors relating to
Canadian federalism.178 Therefore, it is important to consider
decisions from provincial courts when considering the
circumstances in which class arbitration might arise elsewhere in
the nation.
One interesting decision is Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc.,179
which was heard by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Like
other disputes in this area of law, the case involved a class claim
arising in the face of an arbitration agreement.180
When
considering what procedures might be proper, the court stated that:
[w]ithout deciding the point, it would appear that s. 20(1) [of the
Ontario Arbitration Act] would permit an arbitrator, at the very
least, to consolidate a number of arbitrations which raise the
same issue. Therefore, it appears at least arguable that if each of
the five named representative plaintiffs here chose to seek
arbitrations of their claims, an arbitrator might well decide that
those arbitrations could be dealt with together thereby saving
time and expense for all parties. Such possibilities serve to
militate against the central assertion of the plaintiffs that the
arbitration clause operates so as to erect an economic wall

See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
The author discusses this issue at length elsewhere. See generally Strong, First
Principles, supra note 63.
178 For example, Dell is not even currently applicable in Quebec, the jurisdiction
that generated the decision, due to a change in the underlying legislation during the
pendency of the appeal to the Supreme Court. See Saumier, supra note 90, at 1209.
Other limitations might arise due to differences in the relevant provincial legislation on
class actions.
179 [2002] 58 O.R. 3d 299, 21 B.L.R. 3d 104 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
180 See id., para. 1.
176
177
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barring customers of the defendant from effectively seeking
relief.181

This decision is intriguing in several regards. First, it (like
Dell) suggests that the question of whether to proceed on a
multiparty basis is one for the arbitrator, not the courts. Second,
the judgment does not mention Section 8 of the Ontario
Arbitration Act,182 which involves consolidation of arbitrations
with the consent of all parties.183 Instead, the court relied
exclusively on Section 20(1), which states that “[t]he arbitral
tribunal may determine the procedure to be followed in the
arbitration, in accordance with this Act.”184 Although the phrase
“in accordance with this Act” could be read as referring the
arbitral tribunal back to Section 8(4), it is at least equally likely
that in invoking the provision describing the Arbitration Act’s
broadest grant of discretion the court was suggesting that an
arbitral tribunal could permit a class arbitration to proceed (1)
even over the objection of one of the parties and (2) even without
court intervention.185
Furthermore, by citing Section 20(1) rather than Section 8(4),
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice might be seen as suggesting
that class arbitration should not be considered as entirely
analogous to consolidated arbitration.186 This would be consistent
with the view enunciated by several U.S. commentators that the

181
182
183

Id. para. 55 (emphasis added).
S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 8.
Section 8(4) states:

On the application of all the parties to more than one arbitration the court may
order, on such terms as are just,
(a) that the arbitrations be consolidated;
(b) that the arbitrations be conducted simultaneously or consecutively; or
(c) that any of the arbitrations be stayed until any of the others are
completed.
Id. § 8(4).
184 Id. § 20(1).
185 Id.
186 See id.; see also Kanitz, [2002] 58 O.R. 3d 299, 21 B.L.R. 3d 104.
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policies associated with class suits are different from those
associated with consolidated proceedings and that the
consequences of a decision to refuse class arbitration are different
from a refusal to order consolidation.187 For example, the failure
to certify a class (in a class action or a class arbitration) can sound
the “death knell” of a cause of action, since claimants cannot
justify the financial costs associated with pursuing their claims
individually, no matter how meritorious those claims may be as a
matter of law or policy. 188 Without consolidation of multiple
claims, disputes can still go forward individually, albeit with some
additional expense.189 Without classwide arbitration, many small
claims simply cannot or will not be heard.190
In many ways, Kanitz does not prove useful as a practical
matter, since the Ontario legislature amended the Consumer
Protection Act soon thereafter so as to disallow pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer cases.191 Nevertheless, the
reasoning used in Kanitz suggests, together with Dell, that there is
judicial support for the proposition that arbitrators may have the
ability to decide their own jurisdiction, even in disputes involving
class claims.192 However, Seidel signals some resistance to this
idea, based on differing notions of arbitrator competence regarding
class-type remedies and relief.193 Nevertheless, the cases suggest
that the debate about class arbitration in Canada is developing and
is addressing issues that are somewhat similar to those currently
187 See Sternlight, supra note 107, at 86; see also Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra
note 41, at 1038-55.
188 See Weston, supra note 81, at 1728-30. Indeed, that is precisely what happened
in Dell. See Grant Hanessian & Christopher Chinn, The U.S. Model for International
Class-Action Arbitration, 75 ARB. 400, 407 (2009).
189 See Weston, supra note 81, at 1730.
190 See id. at 1726-27.
191 See Consumer Protection Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30 (Can.
Ont.) (containing the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, § 7(2), stating that “any term or
acknowledgment in a consumer agreement . . . that requires . . . that disputes . . . be
submitted to arbitration is invalid insofar as it prevents a consumer from exercising a
right to commence an action in the Superior Court of Justice given under this Act”).
192 See Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc., [2002] 58 O.R. 3d 299, 21 B.L.R. 3d 104 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); see also Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC
34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.).
193 See Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns Inc., 2011 SCC 15 (Can.), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531
(Can.).
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under discussion in the United States.
B. What Procedures Must Be Used in Class Arbitration?
1. United States
The second matter to consider concerns the procedures that are
to be used in class arbitration. In particular, courts in the United
States must shortly decide what role, if any, judges may or should
have in reviewing the procedural decisions of the arbitral tribunal.
This is a question that the Supreme Court declined to address in
Stolt-Nielsen, leaving the lower federal courts to struggle with a
number of pressing issues.194
The coming years will focus primarily on certain partial final
awards rendered in rule-based class arbitration. These awards deal
with whether class arbitration is permitted under the terms of the
arbitration agreement (“Clause Construction Awards”) and
whether the facts of the dispute warrant class treatment (“Class
Determination” or “Class Certification Awards”).195
These
determinations are of the utmost importance to the parties, since
they are in many ways similar to determinations regarding class
certification in judicial class actions.196 It has been said that class
certification in court can either sound the “death knell” for class
proceedings or fuel the drive toward settlement,197 and the same
may be true in class arbitration, since few disputes have
progressed past the clause construction stage.198
One matter that must be addressed is whether partial final
awards arising under the AAA or JAMS class arbitration rules
may or must be reviewed immediately upon being rendered.199
Although the majority in Stolt-Nielsen refused to consider this
point on the belief that the issue had been waived by the parties in
194

See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2

(2010).
195 See AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75, R. 3, 5; see also JAMS Class
Action Procedures, supra note 75, R. 2-3.
196 For further comparison of class action and class arbitration procedures, see
Weston, supra note 81, at 1725-41.
197 See id. at 1728-30.
198 See AAA Brief, supra note 60, at 22-23 (the percentage of disputes progressing
is twenty-four percent).
199 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2.
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this instance, the opinion did suggest (obiter) that it was inclined
to permit immediate review of this type of award because to do
otherwise would work a hardship to the parties.200 This approach
was strongly opposed by the dissenting justices, who read previous
Supreme Court precedent as forbidding parties from contracting
for this type of early judicial review.201 The absence of a
definitive ruling on this issue has already led to confusion in the
lower courts.202
A second matter to consider involves the proper scope and
standard of review for these sorts of partial final awards,
regardless of the timing of that review. Two possibilities appear to
exist. The first would involve the same deferential standard and
limited scope of review that has been traditionally used in
arbitration.203 Although judicial review of partial final awards
would be more systematically sought in class disputes than is
usually the case in other forms of arbitration and at an earlier stage
of the proceedings, use of a deferential standard would be
consistent with existing arbitral practice concerning these sorts of
awards.204
The second alternative is much more troubling. In this
approach, courts would review partial final awards in class
arbitration using a less deferential standard, such as review for a
mistake of law.205 Some people may claim that this is the
necessary result under Stolt-Nielsen, given that the majority
refused to return the issue of the interpretation of the arbitration
agreement to the arbitral tribunal.206 Furthermore, the majority’s
refusal to say whether the concept of vacatur for manifest
disregard of law survived Hall Street207 could be seen as a means
of leaving the door open for a future decision allowing review of
See id.
See id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202 See Countrywide Fin. Corp. v. Bundy, 187 Cal. App. 4th 234, 247-53 (2010).
203 See BORN, supra note 112, at 36-37.
204 Partial final awards have long been available in arbitration, although such awards
have been rendered irregularly and have been largely discouraged. See id. at 2430-33.
205 Judicial review of the merits of an award still exists in some jurisdictions. See
id. at 2638-39.
206 See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1782 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
207 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 591-92 (2008).
200
201
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the merits of these kinds of partial final awards.208
This approach would be problematic enough if the review
focused only on procedural issues,209 but it is by no means clear
that the matters that are at the heart of these partial final awards
are indeed procedural only.210 Furthermore, use of a less
deferential standard of review could be seen as creating a mixed
blend of arbitral and judicial competence, which is something that
would appear to be contrary to the concept of arbitration as
involving a neutral, non-governmental decision-maker.211
Allowing courts to review the merits of partial final awards would
also increase judicial workloads, perhaps significantly, and affect
other key attributes of arbitration, such as informality and
privacy.212
The current state of U.S. law on the scope and standard of
review is unclear. Although the majority in Stolt-Nielsen made no
reference to the fact that substantive review might now be
required, Justice Ginsburg suggested in her dissent that she found
the review procedure used in Stolt-Nielsen troubling.213 However,
it is safe to say that if it had been the majority’s intent to depart
from well-established principles of law regarding the standard and
scope of review, one would have expected an explicit discussion
of the benefits and detriments of such an approach as well as a
detailed enunciation of the method to be used going forward.214 In
the absence of such remarks, it would appear appropriate to
conclude that such a rule is not currently in place. Furthermore,
the fact that the majority refused to opine on the timing of judicial
review of partial final awards in class arbitration suggests that
questions regarding scope and standard have also been
postponed.215

See id. at 1768 n.3.
See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (2009).
210 See Buckner, Due Process, supra note 72, at 243-44.
211 See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 143, ¶ 661.
212 See Reuben, supra note 209, at 1136.
213 Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214 See Strong, First Principles, supra note 63, at 51-52.
215 See id. at 51.
208
209
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These concerns relate to the rule-based approach to class
arbitration. However, the United States has at various times used
a common law-based approach to class arbitration. While this
procedure may no longer be in use in the United States,216 it merits
at least some brief discussion, if only to provide fodder for
comparative analysis.
Unlike rule-based class arbitration, which simply invites courts
to review certain partial final awards at the parties’ request,
common law forms of class arbitration give courts original and
mandatory jurisdiction over issues such as class certification,
notice and fairness approvals of the final arbitral award.217 This
shared form of jurisdiction has resulted in use of the term “hybrid
model” to describe the way in which courts “remain involved in
the class action-related aspects of the arbitration, to assure that due
process protection of absent class members is provided,”218 even
though arbitral tribunals retain responsibility for evaluating the
merits of the case.219
The hybrid model of class arbitration gives rise to two major
problems. First, this approach conflicts with the fundamental
principle that matters in arbitration are to be decided by a neutral,
non-governmental decision-maker.220 Although the partial final
award system set forth in the specialized rules of class arbitration
also involves some court participation, that mechanism is less
troubling because judicial involvement occurs only at the
invitation of the parties.221 The hybrid model, in contrast, involves
the forceful insertion of the court into the arbitral process, thereby
infringing on arbitration’s status as a private system of
adjudication.222
Second, hybrid proceedings give rise to difficulties with
respect to the issues that the court is determining. There is a
fundamental difference between ensuring the procedural fairness
of the arbitral process through a review process and substituting
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See Buckner, Toward, supra note 49, at 301.
See id. at 320-23.
Buckner, Due Process, supra note 72, at 226.
See id. at 228.
See BORN, supra note 112, at 217.
See Strong, First Principles, supra note 63, at 16-17.
See id. at 16.
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judicial decisions for arbitral decisions on matters of procedure. 223
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the issues given to the
court in a hybrid proceeding (i.e., certification of and notice to the
class as well as control over fairness approvals of the final arbitral
award) are entirely procedural.224
As the above suggests, there are significant questions about the
proper procedure to be used in class arbitration in the United
States, even though the device has been in use for thirty years.
While these issues are not fatal to the continued use and
development of class arbitration in the United States, there will
doubtless be significant litigation in the coming years as parties
attempt to define what practices are permissible.
2. Canada
Canada stands in a very different position than the United
States because no class arbitration has yet taken place in Canada.
As such, there are no established procedures to consider.
However, Canadian arbitrators may appear to be empowered to
consider the possibility of class arbitration in some provinces.225
Furthermore, it may be that Canadian legislators, arbitral
institutions or parties may be inclined to adopt class arbitration
procedures through non-judicial means. As such, it is useful to
consider what procedures might be appropriate in a Canadian class
arbitration.
First, Canadians could embrace the hybrid model of class
arbitration, which was how the device first developed in the
United States.226 Although there could be few jurisprudential
objections if this approach were adopted through legislative
means, since legislatures are often free to adopt procedures that
parties and courts cannot, Canadians may do well to avoid this
form of class arbitration for several reasons.227
For example, “[t]he concept that the court is an effective
watchdog overseeing due process under the hybrid model of class
arbitration sounds nice; but it may be more a vestige of the historic
223
224
225
226
227

See BORN, supra note 112, at 1781; Reuben, supra note 209, at 1137.
See Buckner, Due Process, supra note 72, at 230.
See supra notes 160-191 and accompanying text.
See Buckner, Due Process, supra note 72, at 227.
Id. at 239, 234-35.
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mistrust of arbitration than practical reality.”228 Furthermore, the
cost and delay associated with a back-and-forth system of split
competence is contrary to the common notion of arbitration as a
faster and less expensive method of dispute resolution.229 Finally,
the way in which this method of class arbitration involves shared
jurisdiction threatens the notion of arbitration as involving a
neutral decision-maker.230 Thus the hybrid model does not seem
to be a promising route for Canada to take when developing its
own form of class arbitration.
Second, Canadians could choose to adopt procedures
resembling the rule-based model of class arbitration currently used
in the United States and Germany.231 This approach is much more
promising than the previous alternative, since the AAA, DIS and
JAMS have, each in their own way, addressed many of the salient
issues relating to large-scale arbitration.232
For example, if Canada or one of its provinces wished to make
a limited entry into the world of class or collective arbitration, it
could follow the DIS model, which is restricted to one particular
type of substantive dispute.233 Those looking to adopt a more
trans-substantive approach could consider rules enacted by the
AAA or JAMS, which already reflect significant similarities to
Canadian class action procedures.234
Nevertheless, some
amendments might be made to make the procedure more
Canadian. For example, criteria regarding the availability and
maintainability of class procedures could be altered to reflect
Canadian standards rather than Rule 23 of the U.S. Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.235 Alternatively, some change to the partial
final awards system could be made if Canadian audiences found
that such a system involved an inappropriate contractual expansion
Id. at 238.
See id. at 237.
230 See BORN, supra note 112, at 217; Strong, First Principles, supra note 63, at 17.
231 DIS Supplementary Rules, supra note 4; AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note
75; JAMS Class Action Procedures, supra note 75.
232 See supra note 229.
233 See Strong, DIS, supra note 4, at 149.
234 See generally AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75; JAMS Class Action
Procedures, supra note 75 (providing rules which might be considered for adoption).
235 See supra Part I.B (comparing class actions in the United States and Canada);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
228
229
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of judicial review of arbitral awards.236 One solution might be to
defer review of these issues until the time the final award is
rendered.237
There are several ways a rule-based model of class arbitration
could be adopted in Canada. First, the procedures in question
could be enacted by a legislative body.238 Second, an arbitral
institution such as the Canadian Commercial Arbitration Centre
could create its own set of specialized rules for use in Canadian
disputes. Third, parties to individual disputes could agree to adopt
one of the specialized sets of arbitral rules already in existence, in
whole or in part.239
Interestingly, some Canadian parties may already be subject to
specialized arbitral rules involving class arbitration, since both the
AAA Supplementary Rules and the JAMS Class Action
Procedures can be imposed as a result of the parties’ having
previously agreed to use any one of the other rule sets offered by
either the AAA or JAMS, respectively, and both the AAA and
JAMS provide services at the international level.240 The fact that
the AAA and JAMS are not Canadian institutions should not pose
any difficulties under Canadian law, since Canadian jurisprudence
takes the view that arbitration is “territorially neutral” and the use
of an arbitral institution that is based outside of Canada is not
236 Canada, as a Model Arbitration Law jurisdiction, may view contractually
expanded review as problematic. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 47, art. 9;
Vikram Raghavan, Heightened Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: Perspectives From
the UNCITRAL Model Law and the English Arbitration Act 1996 on Some U.S.
Developments, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 103, 121-28 (1998). But cf. Barry Leon & Laila Karimi,
The Canadian Position: Can Parties to an Arbitration Agreement Vary the Statutory
Scope of Judicial Review of the Award?, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 459 (2008)
(arguing that the majority opinion in Hall Street found that “parties cannot expand the
scope of judicial review of arbitral awards” on language of the FAA alone).
237 See ICSID Arbitration Rules, art. 41, effective Apr. 2006, available at
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/index.jsp (select “Rules” hyperlink) (providing that the
Tribunal will determine if any jurisdictional challenges will be heard as a preliminary
matter or joined in the case on the merits).
238 Manitoba has already considered this option. See Man. Law Reform Comm’n,
supra note 90, at 3-4, 22-23.
239 Stolt-Nielsen showed how international parties can adopt the AAA
Supplementary Rules in part by special agreement post-dispute. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (2010).
240 AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75, R. 1(a); JAMS Class Action
Procedures, supra note 75, R. 1(b).
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legally troubling.241 Similarly, no problems arise by virtue of the
fact that Canadian, rather than U.S. parties, would be involved in
the dispute, since neither of the rule sets require the parties to be of
any particular nationality.242
One interesting point to consider is whether Canadian courts
would take the view that class claims could only be properly heard
in the judicial context even in a case where the parties could be
said to have implicitly agreed to class proceedings through the
adoption of the AAA or JAMS rules on class arbitration.243 Seidel
suggests that the outcome might turn on whether the arbitral
tribunal was considered to have sufficient ability to bind the entire
class.244 However, the answer might depend on where the suit was
filed, since each province or territory might decide the issue
differently.
Notably, the fact that the class treatment should be considered
under a particular set of rules does not mean that class arbitration
should necessarily result. Neither the AAA Supplementary Rules
nor the JAMS Class Action Procedures require the imposition of
class proceedings in any case where they are invoked.245 Instead,
both sets of rules explicitly state that the mere applicability of the
rules does not require a determination that class proceedings are
proper, although the procedures and standards outlined in the rules
will be used when answering the question of whether class
treatment is warranted.246 If the necessary requirements are not
met, then the arbitral tribunal will hear the claim on a bilateral
basis or dismiss the arbitration altogether, depending on the terms
of the parties’ agreement and the nature of the claim asserted.247

See Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 801, paras. 52, 55-59 (Can.).
242 See id.
243 See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
244 See Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, para. 39 (Can.).
245 See AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75; JAMS Class Action Procedures,
supra note 75.
246 See AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75, R. 3; JAMS Class Action
Procedures, supra note 75, R. 2.
247 See AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 75, R. 3; JAMS Class Action
Procedures, supra note 75, R. 2.
241
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C. What Is the Nature of the Right to Proceed as a Class?
1. United States
The third and final point to consider involves the nature of the
right to proceed as a class and the effect that determination can or
should have on class arbitration. The issue was first heard by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, which
held that the class action provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot “abridge, enlarge or modify” any substantive
right and, as such, should be considered procedural in nature.248
Although the analysis of the issue in Amchem was formalistic at
best, in that it relied primarily on the placement of the right in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the decision may influence how
the issue is framed going forward.249 However, several circuit
courts have “evaluate[d] the enforceability of the class action
waivers under the federal substantive law of arbitrability,”250
which suggests Amchem’s characterization of the nature of the
right may not be the only analytical path to take.
Characterizing a right as procedural or substantive is an
important endeavour, since U.S. courts regularly permit parties to
waive their procedural rights in order to obtain the benefits of
arbitration.251 Given that waivers have become central to the class
arbitration analysis in the United States as a result of AT&T, it
would be useful to confirm whether Amchem can be considered a
reliable precedent in cases involving class arbitrations, as opposed
to class actions.252 However, this is in many ways a novel issue,
since no one has ever attempted to waive the right to proceed as a
class outside the arbitral context.253
Several factors may affect the waiver analysis. For example,
courts must consider whether the right at issue is enacted for the
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997).
Subsequent case law has done little to clear up this issue. See id.; Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs., PA v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1461 (2010).
250 Nat’l Supermkts Ass’n. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 634 F.3d 187,
194 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
251 See MARTIN DOMKE, ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 7:4 at 7-12
(2010).
252 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Nat’l
Supermkts Ass’n., 634 F.3d at 194, 199.
253 See Smit, supra note 65, at 203.
248
249
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benefit of individuals or for the public at large. Traditionally,
parties have been able to contract out of individual procedural
rights but not those that are intended to inure to society as a
whole.254 This makes sense, since the individual in question is
considered capable of determining which individual right is more
important to him or her and can do a reasonably rational costbenefit analysis.255 Thus, for example, the right to a jury trial—
which is individual to the parties involved in the dispute—may be
waived, even though the right to a jury is constitutionally
protected, because the individual nature of the right to a jury trial
allows one-to-one analogies and set-off. Notably, it may be
relevant that individuals are allowed to waive the right to a jury
trial even in the purely judicial context, something that has not
ever been tried with respect to waivers of class remedies.256
However, it is not altogether clear whether the right to proceed
as a class can or should be considered individual in nature.
Indeed, AT&T shows several problems with that approach.257 This
is particularly true if the inquiry is limited to an economic costbenefit analysis conducted on an entirely individual basis.258
The waiver in question in AT&T was extremely
comprehensive, in that it:
provide[d] that customers may initiate dispute proceedings by
completing a one-page Notice of Dispute form available on
AT&T’s Web site. AT&T may then offer to settle the claim; if
it does not, or if the dispute is not resolved within 30 days, the
customer may invoke arbitration by filing a separate Demand for
Arbitration, also available on AT&T’s Web site. In the event
the parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement specifie[d] that
AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; that
arbitration must take place in the county in which the customer
is billed; that, for claims of $10,000 or less, the customer may
choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone,

254 See Armendariz v. Found. Heath Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 680 (Cal.
2000); BORN, supra note 112, at 1776.
255 See id.
256 See Smit, supra note 65, at 203.
257 See AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
258 See id.
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or based only on submissions; that either party may bring a
claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the
arbitrator may award any form of individual relief, including
injunctions and presumably punitive damages. The agreement,
moreover, denied[d] AT&T any ability to seek reimbursement
of its attorney’s fees, and, in the event that a customer receives
an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last written settlement
offer, require[d] AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and
twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.259

In presenting its case to the Supreme Court, AT&T argued that
the waiver satisfied the two most often-cited rationales for class
relief: access to justice and deterrence.260 However, these interests
were framed exclusively in individualized terms.261 For example,
the argument was made that concerns about access to justice
disappear if individual members of the purported class can find
reasonable access to justice for their individual claims.262
Furthermore, AT&T took the view that access to justice can be
considered solely in economic terms, using a utilitarian analysis
that simply looks at whether any eventual award to the claimant
equals or exceeds individual damages and out-of-pocket
transaction costs.263 Although the majority spent very little time
on this issue, the majority opinion did appear to adopt AT&T’s
rationale.264
The question of deterrence was also formulated by AT&T as
an entirely individualized issue.265 Commentators have noted that
class relief has a deterrent effect to the extent that such relief
provides either a realistic reflection of the monetary injuries
caused by the respondent or a sum large enough to cause the
respondent to reconsider its potentially harmful activities.266
Id. at 1744.
These are not the only interests at stake in class suits. See infra notes 320-17 and
accompanying text.
261 See AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (2011).
262 See id.
263 See id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, AT&T, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09893), 2010 WL6617833 at *3 [hereinafter AT&T Petition].
264 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
265 See AT&T Petition, supra note 263, at 30.
266 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 121-22.
259
260
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AT&T claimed that the waiver at issue in AT&T met these goals
because it provided individual claimants with an economically
viable route to justice that would accurately compensate claimants
for actual, non-frivolous injuries suffered, and thus, acted as an
adequate deterrent measure to the corporation.267
The dissenting justices in AT&T took a very different view of
the deterrence and compensation issues.268 For example, Justice
Breyer noted that under this waiver:
“the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a
$30.22 dispute is still just $30.22.” . . .
What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the
Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming
from a $30.22 claim? . . . “The realistic alternative to a class
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”. . . . [N]onclass
arbitration over such sums will . . . sometimes have the effect of
depriving claimants of their claims.269

This more holistic approach was also recently reflected in In re
American Express Merchants’ Litigation.270 There, the Second
Circuit noted (post-Stolt-Nielsen) that the only way for a party to
vindicate its statutory rights in the antitrust realm was through the
class remedy, since the costs of mounting even an individual
antitrust action would range from several hundred thousand dollars
to something in excess of $1 million just for expert economic
analysis alone, with a maximum recovery of $13,000, which,
when trebled, would be less than $40,000.271 Interestingly, in its
decision, the Second Circuit quoted Amchem for the proposition
that “[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his
See AT&T Petition, supra note 263, at 19-22.
See AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Kagan joined in the dissent.
269 Id. (citations omitted).
270 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011).
271 See id. at 198.
267
268
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or her rights.”272
A similar analysis was conducted by the arbitration tribunal in
Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic,273 which
involved a collective claim in the context of an ICSID
arbitration.274 There, the tribunal focused on the fact that a
collective was necessary to give force to the treaty-based right to
relief.275 Notably, this right existed even though the mass claims
were being asserted outside the consumer realm.276
Allowing corporate actors to adopt procedures that unilaterally
reduce the amount of damages payable to groups of claimants may
be acceptable if class suits are seen solely in economic or
individualized contractual terms. However, that may not be the
best way to conceptualize class relief in arbitration or in
litigation.277 For example, although some types of class suits (such
as those involving mass torts) appear to act primarily as
compensatory mechanisms, other types of class relief (such as
those in the consumer context) are viewed as fulfilling both
regulatory and compensatory functions.278
Class relief also addresses certain concerns that cannot be
formulated as an aggregation of individual interests. For example,
class relief appears to play an educative role, alerting potential
claimants to the existence and extent of potential injuries.279 It
also provides a mechanism for allowing indigent claimants to have
272 Id. at 194 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
273 ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/07/5
(2011),
available
at
www.iareporter.com/downloads/20110810.
274 See Abaclat Award, supra note 4, at 1.
275 See id. ¶ 484. The dissent denied that failure to allow the claims to proceed en
masse would deprive the claimants of their substantive rights. See Abaclat Dissent,
supra note 4, ¶¶ 254-57.
276 See Abaclat Award, supra note 4, ¶ 461.
277 Indeed, this sort of pure economic analysis of class litigation has not prevailed
outside the realm of arbitration, which begs the question why it is appropriate to do so
within the arbitral context. See Smit, supra note 65, at 210-11.
278 See IBA SUBMISSION, supra note 17, at 5-6; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at
121-22.
279 See Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit
Analyses in Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 74 n.36 (2010)
(citing DAVID S. GOULD, STAFF REPORT ON THE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION SUBMITTED TO
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE 48-52 (Aug. 15, 1972)).
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access not just to formal justice—since the dispute resolution
system at issue in AT&T would provide that—but to sophisticated
and informed justice by creating a mechanism that allows
claimants to obtain the advice of counsel in an economically
viable manner.280
Forcing claimants into small, bilateral arbitrations has not only
the effect of reducing the overall number of claims but also of
reducing the complexity and exposure for each individual claim
brought. This is because claimants in individual arbitrations are
more likely to represent themselves, either because they do not
think that they need a lawyer due to the informality of arbitration
or because they cannot find an affordable attorney without the
promise of a significant contingency fee.281 Claimants in bilateral
arbitration are therefore more likely to bring simple, easy-tounderstand compensatory contract claims rather than the kind of
complicated statutory causes of action and expansive remedies that
give class actions much of their deterrent value.282
The deterrence associated with class suits can also be
expanded from a narrow, individualized perspective (i.e., whether
this particular corporation will be deterred) to a broad, collective
perspective (i.e., whether other companies in this and similar
industries will be deterred after seeing what has happened to this
particular corporation).283 In this regard, it is important to consider
the precedential value of particular tactical decisions. For

See Vince Morabito, Defendant Class Actions and the Right to Opt Out: Lessons
for Canada from the United States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 197, 198 (2004). For
example, recovery of attorneys’ fees may not be enough to allow an indigent client to
hire an attorney, since (1) the attorney may not be able to wait to be paid until after the
case has concluded and (2) the client may not be able to pay the attorney if the client
loses. Most lawyers will not work under these conditions, absent the possibility of a
significant contingency fee based on more than a single claim.
281 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
282 For example, it is extremely unlikely an individual acting alone will bring an
antitrust claim or an international investment action. See In re Am. Express Merchs’
Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 197-99 (2d Cir. 2011); cf. Abaclat Award, supra note 4, ¶ 458
(noting that individual claimants are unlikely to finance arbitration themselves).
283 The majority in Abaclat noted the possibility that collective suits could bring
unique pressure to bear on rogue debtors. See Abaclat Award, supra note 4, ¶ 514. The
dissent urged against an expansive reading of the ability of international investment
arbitration to reach claims of this nature. See Abaclat Dissent, supra note 4, ¶¶ 265-74.
280
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example, if waivers such as the one at issue in AT&T are allowed
in one individual instance, then one can expect them to proliferate,
expanding into any area of law where class suits are common and
reducing the likelihood of both class actions and class
arbitrations.284 Although common law courts may not always be
comfortable contemplating broad regulatory issues, some
consideration can and should be given to the long-term, global
effect of individual decisions, particularly in situations where the
legislature has indicated the need and propriety of class relief as a
regulatory mechanism.285
The various restricting factors associated with bilateral
arbitration suggest that it is significantly more cost-effective for a
corporation to defend a (perhaps vanishingly small) series of
individual contract claims in arbitration, despite the inefficiencies
and increased per-claimant transaction costs, than it is to defend a
class suit that includes both more people and more expansive
causes of action.286 Indeed, such cost-effectiveness would be
anticipated, given that businesses are encouraged or, in some
cases, required to act in an economically rational manner.287 In
some ways, considering the social benefits of class arbitration
could be seen as inconsistent with the corporate duty to maximize
profit.

284 See Gutting Class Action, supra note 84. Indeed, AT&T appears to have
interpreted the decision in AT&T as foreclosing the possibility of anything other than
individualized relief. See Neil, supra note 87. Although several cases were filed to
resolve this issue, the question appears to have been mooted as a result of the decision by
the U.S. Department of Justice to bring its own antitrust action. See Gruenwald, supra
note 87.
285 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The
aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary
response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government.”); see also In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d at 199; Bisaillon v.
Concordia Univ., 2006 SCC 19, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666, para. 46 (Can.).
286 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Abaclat Award, supra note 4, ¶¶ 537, 545.
287 Although there is a growing movement to encourage corporate actors to behave
in a socially responsible manner, those principles are not yet fully developed. See
Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect
Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765,
771, 787 (2009).
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2. Canada
The United States is not the only country to have struggled
with how to characterize the right to proceed as a class. The
Supreme Court of Canada has also considered the issue, though
the analysis differs somewhat, possibly because the issue arose as
a jurisdictional matter in a dispute involving the intersection
between class actions and arbitration.288
The case at issue, Bisaillon v. Concordia University,289
involved a group of union employees who sought to have a class
certified in court despite a provision in their collective bargaining
agreement requiring grievance arbitration.290 The Supreme Court
held that the right to proceed as a class was procedural in nature,
focusing on the placement of the right in the Quebec Rules of
Civil Procedure and on precedent from the Quebec Court of
Appeal that the class remedy’s “use neither modifies nor creates
substantive rights.”291
Interestingly, the court in Bisaillon did not appear to consider
the possibility of a class arbitration, instead contemplating only a
judicial class action or a bilateral arbitration.292 Because a class
proceeding in court would “undermine[ ] two pillars of [their]
collective labour relations system: the exclusivity of the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction and the collective representation system,”
the Supreme Court decided to give precedence to the arbitration
provision in this instance.293
Just one year later, the Supreme Court was asked to decide a
similar issue in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des
consommateurs.294 However, this case arose in the context of a
consumer class action rather than a labor dispute.295 Rather than
emphasizing the importance of protecting collective bargaining
agreements, the court here focused on the need to respect party
See Bisaillon, 2006 SCC, [2006] 1 S.C.R. paras. 15-19.
Id.
290 Id. paras. 7, 10.
291 Id. paras. 15, 17; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613
(1997); supra note 246 and accompanying text.
292 Bisaillon, 2006 SCC, [2006] 1 S.C.R. paras. 13-14.
293 Id. para. 46.
294 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.).
295 Id. para. 4.
288
289
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autonomy and the substantive nature of the right to arbitration.296
Thus the Supreme Court sent the dispute:
to arbitration on the grounds that: (1) the class procedure in
Quebec is a procedural vehicle that, by its nature, is incapable of
conferring powers on a court over a subject matter that falls
within the jurisdiction of arbitrators; (2) parties’ choice of
arbitration is an exercise of their substantive rights and should
be given judicial deference; and (3) arbitrators should rule first
on their jurisdiction unless the issue is a matter of law and its
disposition does not require any factual inquiries.297

This is an interesting analysis, since it suggests that in
designating the right to proceed as a class as procedural, the
Supreme Court of Canada was simply setting a limit on the power
of the Canadian courts to involve themselves in matters more
properly suited to arbitral tribunals.298
However, that
determination does not appear to have any bearing on the ability of
an arbitrator to order class treatment in arbitration. Indeed, arbitral
tribunals considering class arbitration in Canada appear to have
considerable latitude in this regard, particularly since it is not
precisely clear what is entailed in the right to proceed as a class.299
This issue was first raised in intervenor papers submitted by
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) to the
Supreme Court in Dell.300 Not only did the LCIA suggest that
class arbitration was consistent with the policy objectives of class
actions, it also stated that:

Id. para. 160.
Leon et al., supra note 2, at 386.
298 See Dell, 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, para. 216; Bisaillon v. Concordia
Univ., 2006 SCC 19, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666, paras. 16-17 (Can.). Notably, the Supreme
Court in Seidel declined to opine on the nature of the right to proceed as a class, holding
that it was irrelevant to the analysis. See Seidel v. Telus Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R.
531, para. 33 (Can.) (construing legislation from British Columbia as opposed to
Quebec).
299 See supra notes 160-90 and accompanying text.
300 Factum of the Intervener, London Court of International Arbitration in Dell
Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, Supreme Court of Canada, ¶¶ 51–52
(emphasis omitted), available at www.mcgill.ca/files/arbitration/LCIAFactumDell.pdf.
296
297
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[c]rucial to the analysis is the exact nature of the right conferred
by class action legislation. Under one view the right at issue is
not merely a right to sue on a class-wide basis, but rather a right
to sue on a class-wide basis before the courts. From that
perspective, arbitration clauses inevitably conflict with class
action rights.
. . . A different view, however, holds that the right conferred by
class action legislation is simply a right to proceed on a classwide basis. From this perspective, [class arbitration] is not
necessarily inimical to the legislation’s public policy.301

Interestingly, although the Supreme Court did not mention the
LCIA Factum in its decision in Dell, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal did refer to it in a later case, noting that the policy
position enunciated by the LCIA appeared unobjectionable,
although adoption of such an approach would likely have to be by
legislative means, at least in British Columbia.302
The designation of the right to proceed as a class as procedural
in nature has led some commentators to state that these judicial
precedents should be read to mean that “deference to contractually
based arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is generally to
be preferred over the access to justice provided by class
proceedings in Canada.”303 However, that conclusion appears to
go too far, particularly if the issue of class arbitration is viewed as
a question of intent.304 If that is indeed the case, then arbitrators
sitting in Canada have both the right and the duty to give effect to
the parties’ intentions regarding arbitral procedure. This could
transform the right to proceed as a class from one that is
procedural to one that is contractual in nature and make it co-equal
with other contractual rights, including the right to arbitrate the
dispute itself. Given that “legislation on class actions should be
construed flexibly and generously” in Canada due, in part, to the

Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Saumier, supra note 90, at 1221.
MacKinnon v. Nat’l Money Mart Co., 2009 BCCA 103, para. 14 (Can.); see also
Dell, 2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801; Leon et al., supra note 2, at 397.
303 Leon et al., supra note 2, at 389.
304 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
301
302
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“social dimension” of class suits,305 it might be that class
arbitration would be preferred over bilateral arbitration in some
circumstances.
Thus, the view that class relief is or may be procedural in
nature is not in any way fatal to the development of class
arbitration in Canada. Instead, precedent in cases characterizing
the right to proceed as a class as procedural can simply be seen as
requiring the dispute in question to be heard in arbitration, without
making any conclusion about what type of procedure is the most
appropriate vehicle for hearing those claims.
V.
Conclusion
Class arbitration is an issue that the United States has been
grappling with for some time. However, other countries are also
considering the device, either because it is seen as providing
certain benefits that other dispute resolution mechanisms do not or
because it has developed unexpectedly in response to a confluence
of other factors.306 Of these other nations, Canada is perhaps the
most advanced, having considered the intersection of class actions
and arbitration on numerous occasions.307
In order to shed light on the complex issues arising in this area
of law, this Article has compared the different ways that the
United States and Canada approach three separate questions: the
circumstances in which class arbitration is available;308 the
procedures that must or may be used; and the nature of the right to
proceed as a class. From this comparative analysis comes the
conclusion that class arbitration is driven by two different policy
determinations. Ultimately, where each state stands with respect
to these two matters drives its approach to class arbitration.
The first policy concern addresses the proper balance between
policies in favor of class suits and those in favor of arbitration.
While some courts view the two devices as mutually exclusive,

305

Bisaillon v. Concordia Univ., 2006 SCC 19, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666, para. 16

(Can.).
See supra notes 4, 66-68 and accompanying text.
See Leon et al., supra note 2, at 386-98.
308 Although no class arbitration has yet arisen in Canada, it is possible that an
arbitral tribunal sitting in Canada could adopt class arbitration even before action is
taken by a legislature or arbitral organization.
306
307
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other courts use class arbitration as a means of harmonizing the
various interests and concerns.309 Although the Supreme Court of
Canada has not yet found a way of combining the two
mechanisms, opportunities may still exist in cases where different
legislation is at issue. Thus, it may be that class arbitration may
yet develop as a judicial measure in Canada. Indeed, the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice has perhaps taken preliminary steps in
that direction, holding in Kanitz that:
it is apparent that there are two public policies at issue here
which may, to some degree, conflict. While the Class
Proceedings Act, 1992 represents one public policy, the
Arbitration Act, 1991 represents another. There is no reason to
prefer one over the other if there should be a conflict between
the two. However, these public policies do not have to be
interpreted in a manner such that they do conflict. They can be
interpreted
in
a
manner
where
they
co-exist.
[T]he Class Proceedings Act, 1992 itself requires the court to
consider whether a class action is the preferable procedure for
the resolution of the common issues before granting a
certification order. In considering whether a class action is the
preferable procedure, the court must take into account
alternative methods of redressing the putative class members’
complaints.
It would seem unarguable that the arbitration of claims is one
such other procedure.310

Ontario’s approach appears very similar to that taken in the
United States, particularly in the days when class arbitration was
just beginning. Thus, for example, the California Supreme Court
stated in the first U.S. case on class arbitration, Keating v.
Superior Court,311 that:
[t]his court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
309
310
311

See, e.g., Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. (2002), 58 O.R. 3d 299 (Can.).
Id. ¶¶ 51-53 (citations omitted); see also Leon et al., supra note 2, at 390-94.
See id. at 307.
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class action device for vindicating rights asserted by large
groups of persons. . . . Denial of a class action in cases where it
is appropriate may have the effect of allowing an unscrupulous
wrongdoer to “retain[ ] the benefits of its wrongful conduct.”
...
One possible solution to this dilemma would be to hold that
arbitration agreements contained in contracts of adhesion may
not operate to stay properly maintainable class actions. The
statutes and public policy supportive of arbitration require,
however, that this result be avoided if means are available to
give expression to the basic arbitration commitment of the
parties. We turn our attention, therefore, to the solution offered
by franchisees: that the arbitration itself proceed on a classwide
basis.312

Ultimately, the California Supreme Court decided in Keating
to require class arbitration because “an order for classwide
arbitration in an adhesion context would call for considerably less
intrusion upon the contractual aspects of the relationship.”313 This
respect for the parties’ contractual rights appears very similar to
Canadian courts’ concern for the substantive rights of the parties
to arbitration.314
It therefore appears that courts in both Canada and the United
States recognize (1) the importance of policies in favor of both
class relief and arbitration and (2) the possibility of harmonizing
the various concerns rather than elevating one over the other.315
However, a second policy concern is also suggested by the cases.
This matter relates to whether and to what extent arbitration and
litigation can and should be considered as equally viable dispute
resolution mechanisms and whether they should reflect the same
roles in the larger legal scheme and offer the same remedies to the
parties.316
312 See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206-07 (Cal. 1982) (citations
and footnotes omitted), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984); Leon et al., supra note 2, at 307.
313 Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
314 See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
315 See, e.g., Keating, 645 P.2d at 1192; Kanitz v. Rogers Cable, Inc. (2002), 58
O.R. 3d 299 (Can.).
316 Interestingly, this issue has not been discussed at length by commentators. See
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The second point—the equivalency of available remedies—
appears to be a hotly contested issue in Canada.317 However, this
issue is far less important in the United States. Instead, the debate
in the United States focuses on whether and to what extent
arbitration is able to give effect to certain statutory rights, which
gives rise to a discussion about the nature of those rights and how
they must or can be protected.318
However, the problem in the United States is that many of
these discussions are formulated entirely in individualistic terms
that facilitate superficially simple waiver analyses.319
Furthermore, the debate appears to focus almost exclusively on
access to justice and deterrence, with little, if any, mention being
made of other policy considerations320 or of the various public
benefits associated with class relief, including:
(1) the ability to set legal precedent that is important for future
individual and class action cases; (2) the ability to promote
public education concerning questionable business and industrial
practices that are being challenged in representative litigation;
(3) the ability to uncover a pattern of wrongdoing that otherwise
would not be apparent from infrequent or widely scattered
individual cases; and (4) the ability to promote intangible
psychological benefits accruing to a public that would feel less
frustrated about the unavailability of any redress when the
vindication of group rights can be observed.321

To some extent, the United States’ focus on individual rights
DOMKE, ET AL., supra note 251, § 1:3, at 1-8 to 1-9 (noting that early precedent
distinguished between commercial arbitration as a substitute for litigation and labor
arbitration as a substitute for avoiding industrial strife, but suggesting that these
distinctions may no longer be applicable); see also Strong, First Principles, supra note
63.
317 See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
318 See Sternlight, supra note 107, at 92-104; see generally Weston, supra note 81
(discussing the constitutional implications of arbitral class actions).
319 See supra notes 254-85 and accompanying text.
320 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 68-72; RACHEL MULHERON, THE CLASS
ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 47-66 (2004);
Burch, supra note 66, at 92-111 (discussing deterrence, information sharing,
accountability and transparency as functions of securities class actions).
321 Luff, supra note 279, at 74 n.36.
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and remedies is understandable, given the emphasis placed on
individual rights in Western legal analysis.322 Nevertheless, courts
and arbitrators must exercise caution, since “extralegal dispute
resolution could easily, even reflexively, adopt market responses
to social conflict.”323 Instead, attention should be paid to larger
issues rather than simply allowing those with “superior economic
power” to take “unilateral control over designing a dispute system
for conflicts to which it is a party.”324 To this end, Richard Posner
has argued not only that “[a]ny alternative to the trial must respect
relevant legal and institutional constraints,” but that “[a]ny
proposed reform must move the legal system in the right direction,
where ‘right’ is defined in accordance with broad social policy
rather than narrow craft standards of success.”325
Thus, both the United States and Canada, in their own ways,
must consider whether class arbitration can or should play the
same role as class actions in the national legal system.326 This is
an inherently difficult task, however, since some authorities
believe that “arbitration is a substitute for adjudication by
litigation”327 while others take the view that there is something
inherently different about the two processes.328 However, it does
appear appropriate to view class arbitration as playing some sort of
regulatory role, since class actions are used in both the United
States and Canada as a means of relieving public entities of the

322 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,
734 (1986) (discussing religion and society).
323 Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of
Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 80 (2009).
324 Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in
Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation in the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
1, 5 (2009).
325 Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 368 (1986)
(condemning any form of private dispute resolution that “disserve[s] fundamental social
interests—while serving all too well the legal profession’s narrow self-interest”).
326 See Burch, supra note 66, at 74.
327 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations From Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8
NEV. L.J. 251, 260 (2007).
328 DOMKE, ET AL., supra note 328, § 1:3, at 1-8 to 1-9; Richard A. Nagareda, The
Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069,
1069 (2011).
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burden of enforcing certain public laws.329 If this is indeed the
case, then it is vitally important to consider the effect of allowing
private parties to eliminate class relief through contractual means
or of permitting courts to force parties into bilateral arbitration,
since doing so could distort the legislatively mandated balance
between public (i.e., state initiated and controlled) and private
means of regulation. Interestingly, the elimination or significant
reduction of class remedies could lead to the imposition of new
regulatory measures that corporate interests might find even less
palatable.330 Indeed, “[f]orgetting the regulatory advantages [of
the current system] is easy when corporations focus exclusively on
the back-end” costs associated with class actions and
arbitrations.331
Class arbitration is a very complicated subject that must be
considered from a variety of perspectives. Despite the fact that
this device relies heavily on domestic laws and policies,
comparative analysis can shed a great deal of light on a wide
variety of issues. This is not to say that class arbitration is perfect
or that it is not in need of additional improvements. Certainly the
preceding discussion has highlighted a number of difficulties
relating to the circumstances in which class arbitration is available,
the procedures that must or may be used, and the nature of the
right to proceed as a class. Nevertheless, “[c]lasswide arbitration,
as Sir Winston Churchill said of democracy, must be evaluated,
not in relation to some ideal but in relation to its alternatives.”332
Though more analysis is needed, this Article has begun that
discussion by comparing two of the leading jurisdictions in this
increasingly important area of law.

329 See IBA SUBMISSION, supra note 17, ¶¶ 5-6; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at
121-22; Burch, supra note 66, at 74-76.
330 See Burch, supra note 66, at 70-77, 128. Several U.S. legislators have proposed
a new form of the Arbitration Fairness Act in the wake of AT&T. See Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R.
1873, 112th Cong. (2011). Furthermore, AT&T has argued against the use of large-scale
bilateral arbitration, even though that is the direct effect of its use of class action waivers
in its arbitration agreements. See Neil, supra note 87.
331 Burch, supra note 66, at 77.
332 Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982).

